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FEATURE ARTICLE
The New Age of Artificial Legal Reasoning
as Reflected in the Judicial Treatment of
the Magnuson-Moss Act and the Federal
Arbitration Act
Andrew P. Lamis*

I. Introduction
A century ago, jurisprudence was captive to maxims detached
from reality, and "word-magic" had become the "bane and the life of
the law."' According to Professor G. Edward White, "[j]udges began
their decisions by making verbal distinctions, defining concepts in
useful ways. They then pronounced their decisions as axiomatic.
From then on it was a rush downward to the result: the axiom was
applied to the facts of a case, and certain things 'inevitably'
followed. ' ' 2 For example, the Sherman Act was deemed inapplicable

*

B.A., magna cum laude, Harvard College, 1981; J.D., Harvard Law School,

1984. The author is a member of the Illinois Bar. In March 2003, he argued on
behalf of the plaintiffs before the Illinois Supreme Court in Borowiec v. Gateway
2000, Inc., 331 Ill. App. 3d 842, 772 N.E.2d 256 (111. App. Ct. 2002), appeal
docketed, No. 94235 (Ill. Oct. 2, 2002). The Borowiec case is part of the body of
decisional law that is the subject of this article.
' Charles E. Clark, The Restatement of The Law of Contracts, 42 YALE L. J.
643, 647 (1933); see also Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence - The Next
Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 443 (1930) (observing that the "traditional approach
is in terms of words; it centers on words; it has the utmost difficulty in getting
beyond words"); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 81 (1973) ("Much of the law
was an exercise in painful abstraction and strained syllogism that bore little
resemblance to the real world it was supposed to govern.").
2 G. Edward
White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism:
Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth Century America, 58 VA. L.
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to a corporation manufacturing 90% of the sugar in the country
because "manufacture"
was adjudged not the same thing as
"commerce." 3 Practical methods of legal analysis, grounded in such
tools as the authoritative principles of statutory construction, were
rendered useless, supplanted by absolutes that precluded reasoning.
Today we see again forms of decisional law that rest on
"word-magic." Courts have found that a federal consumer-protection
statute regulating private dispute resolution mechanisms in product
warranties does not apply to privately devised arbitration procedures.
They have done so because arbitration is "of a different nature" than
the private dispute resolution described in the statute. Another federal
statute, aimed at enforcing voluntary agreements to submit disputes
to a nonjudicial third party for decision, is said to apply to wholly
involuntary and one-sided transactions because of a "federal policy"
found nowhere in the text or legislative history of that statute.
This article will examine the recent judicial treatment of the
interaction of two federal statutes, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act 4 and the Federal
Arbitration Act.5 In this context the article will show how the logic
and principles of statutory analysis have been replaced by "wordmagic" sheathed in a false approach to construction.
Though the analytical process is today described in traditional
terms as an investigation of the text, legislative history and purposes
of a statute, it is in fact governed dispositively by a "policy" that is
merely a judicial creation, based on nothing that Congress has done
or written, grounded solely in a preference of the judiciary. This
approach is rooted in an unacknowledged importation of a
permissible and well-accepted idea, the idea of how canons of
contractual construction can be developed pursuant to federal
statutory policy, over into the realm of statutory construction. This
has not been questioned by the academic commentators or subjected
to critical analysis by the courts. The issue involves the most
common "contract" in American society - the consumer product
warranties that accompany virtually every mass-produced family and
REV. 999, 1001 (1972).
3

United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); see also White, supra

note 2, at 1001 n.7 (citing Knight, 156 U.S. 1).
4 Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12
(1994)).
5 The proper name of the statute is United States Arbitration Act of 1925, Pub.

L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, 201-208
(1994)).
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household item sold in our country.
The Magnuson-Moss Act, at 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a), makes clear
that privately created dispute resolution mechanisms inserted into
product warranties cannot ultimately foreclose consumers' access to
our courts of law. 6 Courts have nonetheless enforced binding
arbitration clauses in product warranties governed by the Act. This
article argues that because of the text, legislative history, and
purposes of the Act, these courts should have declared such binding
arbitration provisions illegal.
Part II provides an overview of the controversy by examining
the recent decisions rendered by the Fifth Circuit, the Eleventh
Circuit, and the Alabama and Texas Supreme Courts that have
enforced binding arbitration clauses in consumer product warranties.
Part III considers the general context of the Magnuson-Moss Act and
answers the question of what was motivating the Congress to act. Part
IV examines the meaning of the key statutory phrase "informal
dispute settlement mechanisms" at the time it was introduced at the
outset of the legislative process. Part V presents a thorough
examination of the legislative history. Part VI closely analyzes the
statutory text. Part VII considers whether the arbitration provided for
in the Federal Arbitration Act conflicts with the purposes of the
Magnuson-Moss Act. In this step-by-step analysis of the legislative
history, statutory text, and underlying purposes of the MagnusonMoss Act, this article studies further the decisions commending
binding arbitration rendered by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits and
the Alabama and Texas Supreme Courts, decisions that the author
contends are deeply flawed. Though it is unnecessary to the statutory
interpretation analysis, Part VIII comments briefly on the principles
of Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
7
and its progeny.
6

15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(1) encourages warrantors to create "informal dispute

settlement mechanisms" to "fairly and expeditiously" resolve consumer warranty

disputes. The Act explicitly regulates "any informal dispute settlement procedure
which is incorporated into the terms of a written warranty to which any provision
of this chapter applies." Id. § 2310(a)(2). It provides that the Federal Trade
Commission "shall prescribe rules setting forth minimum requirements" for such
procedures. Id. Where the mechanism complies with the agency's rules, a consumer
may be required to "resort to such procedure before pursuing any legal remedy
under this section respecting such warranty." Id. § 2310(a)(3). The consumer
remains free to go to court after exhausting the dispute resolution mechanism,
though "any decision in such procedure shall be admissible in evidence" in a
subsequent court proceeding. Id.

7 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
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A century ago Learned Hand, then a practicing lawyer in New
York, wrote a law review article because he saw the state of the law
as imperiled. He found that a series of Supreme Court decisions had
encroached into the legislative arena. He could find nothing in the
reasoning of the court to justify its self-transformation into "a third
camera with a final veto upon legislation with whose economic or
political expediency it totally disagrees." 8 At the core of his sharply
stated alarm was a sense that fundamental unfairness had been
elevated to the level of practically unassailable constitutional
doctrine. Speaking of the labor legislation then being struck down by
the Nation's highest court, he wrote:
For the state to intervene to make more just and equal the
relative strategic advantages of two parties to the contract,
of whom one is under the pressure of absolute want, while
the other is not, is as proper a legislative function as that it
should neutralize the relative advantages arising from
fraudulent cunning or from superior physical force. 9
The judicial action criticized by Learned Hand, one that
thwarts legislative efforts to ensure the fair treatment of parties with
inferior bargaining power, is apparent in the current judicial treatment
of binding arbitration clauses in consumer product warranties
governed by the Magnuson-Moss Act.

II. An Overview of the Controversy
Recently, courts have held that the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act should be construed to permit the insertion of binding arbitration
clauses into those ubiquitous warranties that accompany almost every
consumer product sold in America. 10 These courts have departed
(1984).
8 Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight-Hour Day, 21 HARV. L.
REV. 495, 500 (1908); see
THE JUDGE 118 (1994).

also GERALD

GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND

9 Hand, supra note 8, at 506; see also GUNTHER, supra note 8, at 123.
0 Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes L.L.C., 298 F.3d 470, 478-79 (5th Cir.

2002) (holding valid binding arbitration clause in mobile home warranty; denying
court access to advance claims for warranty breach under the Magnuson-Moss
Act); Davis v. Southern Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1280 (11 th Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 1633 (Mar. 31, 2003); In re American Homestar of
Lancaster, Inc., 50 S.W.3d 480, 490-92 (Tex. 2000); Southern Energy Homes, Inc.
v. Ard, 772 So. 2d 1131, 1135 (Ala. 2000).
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from the holdings of other courts," and repudiated the statutory
construction of the administrative agency responsible for enforcing
the Magnuson-Moss Act. 12 Their decisions rest upon an exercise in
statutory interpretation, aimed at discerning the existence of a
congressional intent to preclude the waiver of a Magnuson-Moss Act
claimant's right to go to court. This analytical process is mandated by
the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions concerning the 1925 Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA"). In these decisions, the Court held that the
"liberal policy" favoring arbitration purportedly enunciated in the
FAA mandates the enforcement of arbitration clauses when a
violation of federal statutory rights is at issue. However, if the
plaintiff can show that in enacting the statute in question, Congress
"did intend to limit or prohibit waiver of a judicial forum for a
particular claim," the Court has determined that such an arbitration
clause need not be enforced. 1 3 Such a congressional intent "will be
deducible from [the statute's] text or legislative history," 14 or "from
11 Among the decisions holding binding arbitration clauses illegal in the
Magnuson-Moss context are Wilson v. Waverlee Homes, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1530
(M.D. Ala. 1997), aff'd without opinion, 127 F.3d 40 (11th Cir. 1997); Pitchford v.
Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 958, 962-65 (W.D. Va. 2000);
Browne v. Kline Tysons Imports, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 827, 831 (E.D. Va. 2002);
Borowiec v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 331 Ill. App. 3d 842, 772 N.E.2d 256 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2002), appeal docketed, No. 94235 (Ill. Oct. 2, 2002); see also Parkerson v.
Smith, 817 So.2d 529, 533 (Miss. 2002) (equally divided court, one justice
concurring in result only).
12 In promulgating legislative regulations under the Magnuson-Moss Act, the

FTC rejected industry arguments for binding arbitration. It noted, "[s]everal
industry representatives contended that warrantors should be allowed to require
consumers to resort to mechanisms whose decisions would be legally binding (e.g.,
binding arbitration). The Rule does not allow this .. " 40 Fed. Reg. 60,210 (Dec.
31, 1975); see also 16 C.F.R. § 703.5(0) (2003) ("[d]ecisions of the Mechanism
shall not be legally binding on any person").
13 Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987)
(directing courts to resolve a purported conflict between the Federal Arbitration Act
and another statute by asking the question of whether "Congress did intend to limit
or prohibit waiver of a judicial forum for a particular claim"). The Supreme Court,
in McMahon, upheld the validity of binding arbitration agreements in the context of
claims brought under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Supreme Court
subsequently considered a number of other federal statutes, but it has never
answered the McMahon inquiry in the affirmative. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989) (holding claims under
Securities Act of 1933 subject to binding arbitration); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (holding claims under Age Discrimination in
Employment Act subject to binding arbitration).
14 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
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an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute's underlying
purposes."' 5

Unlike the Securities Exchange Act,' 6 the Securities Act of
1933, or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,' 8 and every
other statute the U.S. Supreme Court has analyzed as to this issue, the
Magnuson-Moss Act is unique in that Congress specifically
encouraged manufacturers and suppliers to create redress
mechanisms that would enable consumers to resolve their claims
without time-consuming and expensive litigation. In other words,
Congress explicitly legislated regarding that subject matter with
which arbitration is concerned.
Congress used the phrase "informal dispute settlement
procedure," "mechanism" and "proceeding" in the Magnuson-Moss
Act, 19 and stated that all warrantors were encouraged to incorporate
such a procedure into their warranties.20 In promoting the use of
"informal dispute settlement mechanisms" to provide redress for
warranty claims, the Act required that such mechanisms be "fair" and
comply with Federal Trade Commission rules.21 When these
7

Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
15Id. at

227.

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 44, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000)).
17Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000)).
16

18Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81
Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000)).
19Several similar verbal formulations for this concept are used in the Act. 15
U.S.C. §§ 2302(a)(8) and 2310(a)(2) refer to "any informal dispute settlement
procedure." 15 U.S.C. § 2304(b)(1) references "an informal dispute settlement
proceeding." 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(1) refers to "informal dispute settlement
mechanisms." 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(4) uses the language "any dispute settlement
procedure." This article uses the words "procedure," "mechanism," and
"proceeding" interchangeably, just as Congress did.
20 See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(1) ("Congress hereby declares it to be its policy to
encourage warrantors to establish procedures whereby consumer disputes are fairly
and expeditiously settled through informal dispute settlement mechanisms.")
21 See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(2) (commanding the FrC to set "forth minimum
requirements for any informal dispute settlement procedure which is incorporated
into the terms of a written warranty to which any provision of this chapter
applies"); id. § 2310(a)(3) (mandating that the warrantor-created mechanism must
comply with "the requirements of the Commission's rules"); id. § 2310(a)(4)
(giving the FTC the power to "review the bona fide operation of any dispute
settlement procedure resort to which is stated in a written warranty to be a
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mechanisms are in place, the warrantor can require all consumer
claims to be initially decided in a designated alternative forum.
Congress intended that the obligation to participate in such a
procedure would not foreclose a consumer's opportunity to press a
claim for warranty breach in court. Congress stated that "[i]n any
civil action arising out of a warranty obligation and related to a
matter considered in such a [dispute settlement] procedure, any
22
decision in such procedure shall be admissible in evidence.
Congress consistently described the alternative dispute resolution
process as a redress mechanism that would be used "before"
litigation, while at the same time evincing an intention that the
consumer's right to court access be preserved2 3 Congress treated
participation in the informal dispute settlement procedure as "a
prerequisite
to pursuing a legal remedy," rather than a substitute for
4
2

it.

Of central importance is the meaning of the phrase "informal
dispute settlement mechanisms" or "procedures." What exactly was
the Congress up to? If the phrase encompasses arbitration
mechanisms, then binding clauses of the type encountered last year
by the Fifth Circuit in Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC,2 5 and the
Eleventh Circuit in Davis v. Southern Energy Homes, Inc. ,26 should
have been declared violations of the Magnuson-Moss Act.
The phrase "informal dispute settlement mechanisms" is the
linguistic precursor of the modern expression "alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms," which encompasses all redress mechanisms
other than the formal adjudicative processes of our courts of law,
including private arbitrations.27 This is precisely how the phrase

prerequisite to pursuing a legal remedy under this section"); id. § 2310(a)(5)
(granting courts the power, during the period of time before the FTC promulgates
its rules, to "invalidate any such procedure if it finds that such procedure is
unfair").
22 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3)(C)(ii).
23

Id. § 2310(a)(3)(C) (describing the requirement that a "consumer resort to

such procedure before pursuing any legal remedy") (emphasis added); see id. §

2310(a)(3)(C)(i) (no consumer may "commence a civil action ... unless he initially
resorts to such procedure) (emphasis added).
24

15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(4).

25

Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes L.L.C., 298 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2002).

26

Davis v. Southern Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2002),

cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1633 (Mar. 31, 2003).
27

See

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

78 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "alternative
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"informal dispute settlement mechanisms" was used during the 19691974 preparation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. During this
period, senators, representatives, their staff counsel, and the witnesses
who appeared at the five sets of congressional hearings on the
warranty legislation, repeatedly referred to "arbitration" procedures
as one of the chief forms of "informal dispute settlement
mechanisms" that Congress sought to encourage. Congress even
commissioned a study on "informal dispute settlement mechanisms"
in 1971, specifically asking the body that was to undertake this task,

dispute resolution" as "[a] procedure for settling a dispute by means other than
litigation, such as arbitration, mediation, or minitrial"). The phrase "alternative
dispute resolution mechanism" is of relatively recent vintage. See 4 AM. JUR. 2D,
Alternative Dispute Resolution § I (1995) (describing "alternative dispute
resolution" as "a relatively new term"). The phrase was not in regular use during
the period 1969-1974, when the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act was being
prepared by the Congress. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (Rev'd 4th ed.
1968) (no listing for "alternative dispute resolution"); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
(5th ed. 1979) (no listing for "alternative dispute resolution").
28 See, e.g., Consumer Products Guaranty Act: Hearings on S. 3074 Before
the Consumer Subcomm. of the Senate Comm on Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
79 (1970) [hereinafter Consumer Products Guaranty Act Hearings] (statement of
George P. Lamb, General Counsel, Association of Home Appliance Manufacturers)
(arguing that no "governmental supervision" of private industry-created
"procedures for arbitrating consumer claims" should be allowed); id. at 259
(statement of David A. Swankin, Washington representative of the Consumers
Union) (asserting that Congress should not "merely encourage," but instead should
mandate a "system of negotiation and arbitration"); Warranties and Guaranties:
Hearings on H.R. 18056, H.R. 10690, H.R. 12656, H.R. 16782, H.R..13390, H.R..
18758, H.R. 19293, and S.3074 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance
of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91 st Cong., 2d Sess. 64
(1970) [hereinafter Warranties and Guaranties Hearings] (statement of Miles W.
Kirkpatrick, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission) (criticizing House bills that
deleted the provisions encouraging "informal dispute settlement procedures" by
stating that, given the costs of formal litigation, an "arbitration"procedure should
be included in the statute); Consumer Warranty Protection: Hearings on H.R.
6313, H.R. 6314, H.R. 261, H.R. 4809, H.R. 5037, H.R. 10673 Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 122 (1971) (statement of Professor
Fairfax Leary, Jr.) (emphasizing the importance of ensuring that the panel to
"arbitrate" the dispute must consist of "independent and unbiased
decisionmakers"); Consumer Warranty Protection - 1973: Hearings on H.R. 20
and H.R. 5021 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 120-121 (1973)
[hereinafter Consumer Warranty Protection - 1973 Hearings] (questioning of
witnesses by counsel to the Subcommittee about the bona fide operation of an
industry-sponsored "arbitrationpanel") (emphasis added to all).
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the National Institute for Consumer Justice, to study "arbitration."
This also explains why Congress drafted the statute so that it
only makes sense if one treats warranty-breach redress mechanisms
as falling into one of only two broad categories - either (1) formal
adjudicative processes in the courts or (2) "informal dispute
settlement procedures,"
construed to encompass
contractual
arbitration mechanisms along with all other privately created dispute
resolution procedures. Finally, it is why the underlying purpose of the
Act, to stand as a protective shield against the involuntary character
of modern consumer product warranties and the abuses that emerged
therefrom, is served, and not gutted, by the Act's treatment of

manufacturer-developed arbitration
unilaterally imposed on consumers.

procedures

that

could

be

The Fifth Circuit's decision in Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes
LLC is typical of recent judicial treatment of the Magnuson-Moss

Act. In that case, a two-judge majority stated: "We also note that
binding arbitration is not normally considered to be an 'informal
dispute settlement procedure,' and it therefore seems to fall outside
the bounds of the [Act] and the FTC's power to prescribe
regulations."3 0 This view was not based upon any analysis, 3' and it

29 When the legislation was reported out of the Senate's Consumer
Subcommittee in 1971, Senator Marlow W. Cook offered a floor amendment
authorizing the National Institute for Consumer Justice to perform a study on
"existing and potential voluntary settlement procedures, including arbitration."S.
REP. No. 92-269, at 63 (1971) (emphasis added). When Senator Robert Dole spoke
in support of Senator Cook's amendment on the Senate floor, he said Congress
wanted more data on "private dispute settlement techniques, including arbitration
in resolving consumer grievances." 117 CONG. REC. 39626 (Nov. 5, 1971)
(emphasis added).
30 Walton, 298 F.3d at
476.

In a conclusory way, the Walton majority asserted that binding arbitration
"is of a different nature" from "informal dispute settlement procedures," 298 F.3d
at 476, and it added that "binding arbitration is not normally considered an informal
procedure." Id. at 477. The court repeatedly placed emphasis on what is and is not
"normal" or "normally" understood or done. For instance, it observed that "the
government does not normally participate in private binding arbitration
procedures." Id. Following this line of thought, one could also conjecture that
government does not "normally" delineate precisely how private parties can draft
their contracts, but this is exactly what the Magnuson-Moss Act did. Analysis,
resting on unelaborated assertions as to what is "normally" the case, can thwart
statutory interpretation in a variety of ways, as is discussed infra. Such analysis
could be the understandable result of being tasked to define terms that do not have
a precise and universally understood meaning. See Wesley A. Sturges,
Arbitration - What Is It?, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1047 n.57 (1960)
31

182
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troubled the dissenting judge who wrote that he was "extremely
hesitant to conclude that Congress has directly addressed an apparent
statutory ambiguity 32based on a judicial assumption about what a term
'normally' means."
Decisions like Walton, embracing binding arbitration clauses
in the Magnuson-Moss context, suffer from four major analytical
flaws. First, the courts have failed to give careful consideration to the
meaning of the key statutory phrase. Second, they have not
considered the text of the statute as a whole, and have all but ignored
the numerous statutory provisions pertaining to these nonjudicial
procedures. These provisions would be rendered nonsensical if
private arbitration were treated as a species of nonjudicial redress
mechanism distinct from "informal dispute settlement procedures."
Third, having failed to confront the statutory text in a
disciplined way, these courts do not give proper consideration to the
relevant legislative history. Some have wrongly concluded that there
is nothing that can be found in the legislative history to "shed light"
on the issue of whether Congress intended to permit binding
arbitration clauses to be inserted into consumer product warranties. W
Or, alternatively, they have rested their legislative history analysis on

("'Arbitration,' like other terms and concepts in legal lore, is, of course, ever
subject to judicial revision to make the term what the judge may think he should
make it mean for the given case."). But, one need not be satisfied with this result

since tools of statutory construction enable a more precise analysis.
Walton, 298 F.3d at 484 (King, Chief J., dissenting). As is explained below,
Chief Judge King was too quick to conclude that the expression "informal dispute
32

settlement procedure" is ambiguous.
33 See,

e.g., Walton, 298 F.3d at 476 ("The legislative history does not

specifically discuss the availability of arbitration, nor does it define or shed fight on
the meaning of 'informal dispute settlement procedure."'); Davis v. Southern
Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002) (stating that the Act's
legislative history "never directly addresses the role of binding arbitration"), cert.
denied, 123 S. Ct. 1633 (Mar. 31, 2003). This failure to consider the legislative

history has also marked the scholarly commentary in this field. For example, some
commentators have simply assumed without analysis that there is "nothing in the
[Magnuson Moss Act's] text, legislative history, or purposes" that demonstrates an
intention to preclude binding arbitration. Katie Wiechens, Arbitrating Consumer
Claims Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 68 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 1459,
1469 (2001) (emphasis added). Other commentators have apparently looked only at
that legislative history that is readily available by its having been reprinted in the
permanent edition of the United States Code Congressional and Administrative
News ("U.S.C.C.A.N."), even though this represents but a small percentage of the
total legislative history of Magnuson-Moss. See infra notes 149-150.
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a single ambiguous sentence from a 1970 senate report, 34 probably
the least significant of all the senate and house reports because it
pertained to Senate Bill 3074, 35 prior to its substantial revision the
following Summer in 1971.36

34

The Senate Report, pertaining to S. 3074, contained the following language:
Subsection (a) of this section declares that it is Congress' [s] intent that
warrantors of consumer products cooperate with government and
private agencies to establish informal dispute settlement mechanisms
that take care of consumer grievances without the aid of litigation or
formal arbitration. This subsection is merely a statement of policy and
has no operative effect.

S. REP. No. 91-876, at 22-23 (1970); see also In re American Homestar of
Lancaster, Inc., 50 S.W.3d 480, 488-89 (Tex. 2001) (claiming "this passage,"
referring solely to the first sentence of the above-quoted passage and omitting
mention of the second sentence, "arguably demonstrates that Congress
contemplated a consumer's resort to courts or binding arbitration if the informal
dispute settlement mechanism did not resolve the dispute"); Davis, 305 F.3d at
1276 (relying on the first sentence in the above-quoted passage, and italicizing the
words "or formal arbitration"). Relying on this sliver of legislative history, both
Homestar and Davis offered the view that it was Congress's intent to permit
binding arbitration provisions in consumer product warranties. The decisions
asserted that, at a minimum, there was an "absence of any meaningful legislative
history barring binding arbitration." Davis, 305 F.3d at 1276; see also Homestar,
50 S.W.2d at 489. They reached this conclusion, as is discussed infra, both by
placing an inaccurate construction upon the ambiguous sentence they quoted and
by ignoring most of the relevant legislative history.
35 When S. 3074 was first introduced by Senator Warren G. Magnuson on the
floor of the Senate on October 27, 1969, it contained only a generalized statement
encouraging "guarantors to establish procedures whereby consumer disputes related
to performance guarantees are fairly and expeditious [sic] settled through informal
dispute settlement mechanisms." 115 CONG. REC. 31485; see also Consumer
Products Guaranty Act Hearings, supra note 28, at 5 (text of S. 3074). The
legislation on this point thus originally consisted of an unelaborated statement of
policy that had not yet been fully fleshed out. S. 3074 was substantially revised as
to this issue the following year, when the second version of S. 986 was reported out
of Senator Moss's Committee.
36 Compare Consumer Product Warranties and Improvement Act of 1971:
Hearings on S. 986 Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1971) [hereinafter Consumer Product
Warranties and Improvement Act Hearings] (text of S. 986, section 110(a), as it
was originally drafted), with S. REP. No. 92-269, at 31, 33-34 (1971) (text of
revised S. 986, sections 102(a)(1) and 110(a), transforming the 1970 generalized
policy statement into something far more concrete). The transformation was
prompted in significant measure by the recommendations of Myles W. Kirkpatrick,
the Chairman of the FTC. See Consumer Product Warranties and Improvement Act
Hearings,supra note 36, at 34 (statement of Miles W. Kirkpatrick).
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Fourth, these courts have not recognized that treating predispute arbitration clauses as binding conflicts with the underlying
purposes of the Magnuson-Moss Act, a statute created as a reaction to
the inability of consumers to bargain over and meaningfully consent
to the terms of a product warranty. The exposition of this conflict
leads to an appreciation of the limitations
of the teachings in the so37
authority.
of
line
McMahon
called

III. The General Context: What Motivated the

Congress to Act?
In 1969, Senator Warren G. Magnuson was the Chairman of
the Committee of Commerce. His office, and the offices of most of
the members of Congress, had been inundated for several years with
complaints by citizens that manufacturers and retailers of consumer
products were not honoring their "warranties" and "guarantees,"
often presented on attractive parchment paper with "filigree" borders
framing 8confident promises of "trouble-free" use and "no cost"
repairs.
In 1968, public concern led the Johnson administration to
establish the Task Force on Appliance Warranties and Service. 39 The
Federal Trade Commission performed a study for the Task Force,
analyzing over 200 warranties from 50 major appliance
manufacturers. 40 When the Task Force and the FTC reported their
findings on January 8, 1969, the results were disturbing. The report
concluded that "[t]he majority of major appliance warranties
currently in use contain exceptions and exclusions which are unfair to
the purchaser and which are unnecessary from the standpoint of
protecting the manufacturer from unjustified claims or excessive
liability."41 The report also found that "[t]he consumer does not have
a readily available or practical means of compelling the manufacturer
37 See case law cited supra note 13.
31 Consumer Products Guaranty Act Hearings,supra note 28, at 24 (statement

of Sen. Philip A. Hart) ("Nobody here in Congress - no Member of the Senate I am
sure - has been immune from the plague of complaints from consumers about
warranties that don't live up to promises and promises that are made in big type
that are cut to pieces in the small print.").
39 H.R. REP. No. 93-1107, at 24, 26-27 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 7707, 7709.
40 Id. at 26-27, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 7709.
41

Id. at 28, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 7710.
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or the retailer from whom he purchased the appliance or the servicing
agency responsible for
its maintenance to perform their respective
' 42
warranty obligations.

With the introduction of the assembly line and mass
marketing techniques, American industry was making available to
consumers a continually expanding assortment of goods. But with
this desirable development, there arose in the 1950s and 1960s a twofaceted problem that led
to what the FTC called the "rising tide" of
43
consumer complaints.

First, warranties accompanying consumer goods in this era
were almost never bargained-for agreements, but adhesion contracts
created by the seller with an eye toward protecting itself against
liability.
It had become commonplace for manufacturers to
carefully craft their warranties to eviscerate all rights that the
common law afforded consumers, such as the protections of the
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular
purpose.45 Second, manufacturers routinely used warranties as

42

Id. at 27, reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 7710.

H.R. REP. No. 93-1107, at 22-28 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7702, 7705-10 (reporting on the "rising tide of complaints ... received by
Members and committees of the Congress, the Federal Trade Commission, and
other officials and agencies of the Federal Government").
43

" See S. REP. No. 93-151, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1973) (explaining that "the
relative bargaining power of those contracting for the purchase of consumer
products has changed radically" and "almost all consumer products sold today are
typically done so with a contract of adhesion" where "there is no bargaining over
contract terms"); ConsumerProducts GuarantyAct Hearings,supra note 28, at 248
(statement of David A. Swankin, Washington Representative, Consumer Union)
(describing the "take it or leave it" nature of warranties as "a very significant
factor" in "the chaos that exists today").
41 See S. REP. No. 93-151, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973) (noting that the
typical warranty "could be more accurately described as a limitation on liability
rather than a warranty"); 119 CONG. REC. 968 (Jan. 12, 1973) (statement of Sen.
Magnuson that "the issuance of an express warranty while simultaneously
disclaiming the implied warranties is an increasingly common practice which
results in many cases in a document which could be more accurately described as a
limitation on liability rather than a warranty"). See generally Katherine R. Guerin,
Clash of the Federal Titans: The Federal ArbitrationAct v. The Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act - Will the Consumer Win or Lose?, 13 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 4,
9-10 (2001) (citing among the aspects of then-prevalent warranties that prompted
legislative action "complex language that rendered warranty terms
incomprehensible [and] warranties that appeared to give more protection than they
actually did (by provided express warranties combined with disclaimers of all
implied warranties and severe limitations of remedies)"). For a study on how the
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deceptive marketing tools to solicit consumer purchases, using big,
bold type to make the promises to consumers that would convince
them to buy, while using tiny tV e to limit or eliminate those
promises later in the "agreement." As one commentator described
the situation:
In short, the express warranty had become an artfully
contrived method of eliminating the kinds of warranty
protection that all but the most sophisticated buyers would
expect to accompany a product touted to perform properly.
Many purchasers began to realize that the document with
the filigree border emblazoned with "Warranty" or
"Guarantee" was often of no greater value than the paper
on which it was printed.47
As Senator Magnuson explained when he first introduced the
legislation, manufacturers and retailers "hide behind mountains of
48
fine print which negate the very essence of a 'guaranty.'
Approximately three months later, on January 20, 1970, the first day
of congressional hearings, Senator Frank E. Moss began his opening
statement with this observation:

problems of "readability and complexity" were not solved by the Magnuson-Moss
Act, see F. Kelly Shuptrine & Ellen M. Moore, Even After the Magnuson-Moss Act
of 1975, Warranties Are Not Easy to Understand, 14 J. CONSUMER AFF., at 394
(1980).
46 Typical was the warranty of the Baldwin Piano Company. Baldwin sold its
pianos with a beautiful piece of parchment paper that would "guarantee" it would
repair the piano free of charge, as long as the buyer owned the piano. But in the
tiny type at the bottom of the warranty, it revealed that the buyer was expected to
pay for the costs of shipping the piano back to Baldwin's factory if he wanted to
take advantage of the free repair service. See 119 CONG. REc. 968 (Jan. 12, 1973)
(comments of Sen. Magnuson regarding "[c]onsumer anger" when purchasers
discover that "there is full coverage on a piano so long as it is shipped at the
purchaser's expense to the factory"); 120 CONG. REC. 31319 (Sept. 17, 1974) (staff
report of the House Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance describing unfairness
of transportation and shipping charges routinely inserted in warranties).
47 Christopher Smith, The Magnuson-Moss WarrantyAct: Turning The Tables
on Caveat Emptor, 13 CAL. WESTERN L. REV. 391, 393 (1977); see also H.R. REP.

No. 93-1107, at 24 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7705, 7706 (describing
the inability to secure manufacturer compliance with warranties and the
"developing awareness that the paper with the filigree border bearing the bold
caption 'Warranty' or 'Guarantee' was often of no greater worth that the paper it
was printed on").
48 115 CONG. REC. 31483 (Oct. 27, 1969).
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Few, if any, issues plague the consumer more than the one
we will discuss today. The artful words in minute print
under the bold type declaration of "guarantee" or
"warranty" confuse and bewilder even the sophisticated
buyer. The so-called guarantee may prove to be a full
coverage insurance policy against product failure during
the guarantee period, but it is just as likely to be an empty
promise and "insure" only the corporation making it "insure" it, the corporation, of marketing advantages of the
word "guarantee" and insure it against having to pay if the
product fails to work.49
Two additional circumstances exacerbated this problem, well
described by the adage, "what the bold print giveth, the fine print
taketh away."' 5° First, effective government regulation was absent
from this field. This is best evidenced by Senator Moss' statement
that the FTC had become known in Washington circles as the
"sleeping lady of Pennsylvania Avenue." 5' Indeed, granting the FTC
enhanced powers to regulate the marketplace became such a key
feature of this legislation that it became known as the "MagnusonMoss Warranty - FederalTrade Commission Improvement Act."
The second circumstance that made the problem of
meaningless warranties intractable was the absence of a "readily
available or practical means" for consumers to achieve redress for
their warranty-related grievances. 52 The first draft of the warranty
49 ConsumerProducts GuarantyAct Hearings,supra note 28, at 1.

H.R. REP. No. 93-1107, at 24 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7705,
7706 (explaining that the saying "the bold print giveth and the fine print taketh
away" applied since warranties of the period routinely disclaimed the implied
warranties of merchantability and fitness but provided no real warranty protection
in their place).
51 Consumer Product Warranties and Improvement Act Hearings, supra note
50

36, at 2 (explaining that the FTC "finds itself without proper tools to police the
marketplace"); see also S. REP. No. 93-151, at 10 (1973) (describing how in the
late 1960s the FTC "had reached its nadir in public esteem and confidence").
52 H.R. REP. No. 93-1107, at 27 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7705,
77 10. At the time, one was not inclined to commence a lawsuit over a freezer or a
stove that did not work properly, and, even if one was, the amount in controversy
would make costly litigation a fool's errand. See 119 CONG. REC. 968 (Jan. 12,
1973) (observation of Sen. Magnuson that "enforcement of a warranty through the
courts is prohibitively expensive"). In 1975, every consumer in America already
had the right to sue for breach of warranty under U.C.C. § 2-313 or the common
law of sales, a right that had existed for centuries. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
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bill, S. 3074 introduced in 1969, explicitly confronted this issue:
Congress hereby declares it to be its policy to encourage
guarantors to establish procedures whereby consumer
disputes related to performance guarantees are fairly and
expeditiously settled through informal dispute settlement
mechanisms. Such informal dispute settlement procedures
should be created by guarantors in cooperation with
independent and governmental entities and should be
supervised by some governmental or public body.53

IV. The 1969 Meaning of the Phrase "Informal Dispute
Settlement Mechanisms"
Senate Bill 3074 did not define the phrase "informal dispute
settlement procedures" or "mechanisms." 54 Because there is no
apparent pre-existing legislative activity to define this phrase, and no
readily available means to ascertain the intent of the Chairman of the
Senate's Committee on Commerce at the time this language was
drafted, it is useful to explore how this phrase was being used in
America in 1969. 55
To discern this key phrase's meaning, we must scrutinize the
III 165 (Univ. Chi. 1979
facsimile edition). But, the fee-shifting provision in the Act, 15 U.S.C. §
2310(d)(2), breathed life into warranty law by making it practical to sue. The
promotion of nonjudicial dispute resolution mechanisms in the Act was another
effort to make securing redress for warranty breach practical, while offering an
avenue of recovery that was preferable to litigation since it was less timeconsuming and expensive.
53 115 CONG. REC. 31485 (Oct. 27, 1969); see also Consumer Products
Guaranty Act Hearings, supra note 28, at 5 (text of S. 3074). The Senate passed
Bill 3074 with a unanimous vote. See Warranties and GuarantiesHearings, supra
note 28, at 67 (statement of Sen. Frank E. Moss) (the vote on S. 3074 "was
unanimous").
54See 115 CONG. REC. 31483-31485 (Oct. 27, 1969).
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: VOL.

55 Statutory language should be viewed in light of its meaning at the time
when it was being drafted. See Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 669
(1979) ("courts, in construing a statute, may with propriety recur to the history of
the times when it was passed"); People ex rel. Fyfe v. Barnett, 319 11. 403, 409,
150 N.E. 290, 292 (11. 1925) ("[s]tatutes are to be read in the light of attendant
conditions and that state of the law existent at the time of their enactment. The
words of a statute must be taken in the sense in which they were understood at the
time the statute was enacted."); 73 AM. JUR. 2D, Statutes § 150, at 355 (1974).
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historical context, and in particular what was being done at the time
in the area of formulating methods of dispute resolution that could
serve as an alternative to ordinary litigation in the courts. This was an
interesting time, because it directly preceded the explosion of interest
in "alternative dispute resolution mechanisms" that occurred in the
early 1980s. 5 6 However, before turning to that historical analysis, it is
important to consider generally how the phrase and its component
parts were used in and around 1969.
A. The Use of "Informal Dispute Settlement Procedure"
Language at the Relevant Time
Modern courts embracing the foreclosure of court access to
Magnuson-Moss claimants have asserted that "arbitration" and
"informal dispute settlement procedure" are two distinctly different
things. The Walton court asserted cryptically that arbitration is "of a
different nature," and the Davis court found merit in that view. 57 To
test the idea that "arbitration" and "informal dispute settlement
procedure" are distinct concepts, let us see how arbitration was
described during the legislative period. Analyzing the use of the word
"arbitration" during the time the Magnuson-Moss Act was drafted
shows that "arbitration" was not distinct from "informal dispute
settlement procedure."
56

See generally Harry T.

Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea

or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668 (1986).
The Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) movement has seen an
extraordinary transformation in the last ten years. Little more than a
decade ago, only a handful of scholars and attorneys perceived the need
for alternatives to litigation. The ADR idea was seen as nothing more
than a hobbyhorse for a few offbeat scholars. Today, with the rise of
public complaints about the inefficiencies and injustices in our
traditional court systems, the ADR movement has attracted a
bandwagon following of adherents. ADR is no longer shackled with the
reputation of a cult movement.
Id. at 668. Though Judge Edwards' perception that the ADR movement first began
in the late 1970s time period is correct, his characterization of the interest in
alternative dispute resolution before that time as the cult-like preserve of "offbeat
scholars" is not. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, serious scholars were beginning
to study the issue, and, most significantly, so was the United States Congress. This
era was the dawn of what became, in the 1980s, a broad interest in and a
widespread embrace of alternative dispute resolution.
51 Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes L.L.C., 298 F.3d 470, 476 (5th Cir. 2002);
Davis v. Southern Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1276 (lth Cir. 2002)
(quoting Walton), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1633 (Mar. 31, 2003).
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The analysis may begin by noting that the statutory phrase
may be thought of as consisting of two components - a nounal
phrase, "dispute settlement procedure, ' 58 and an adjectival modifier,
"informal." In this sense, it is not unlike the modem phrase "dispute
resolution mechanism" modified by the adjective "alternative." It is
clear that the nounal component of the phrase under discussion was
used interchangeably with the word "arbitration" during the pertinent
time. Seven days before Senator Magnuson introduced S. 3074 on the
floor of the Senate, the U.S. Supreme Court justices heard arguments
across the street in the case of Detroit & Toledo Shore Line Railroad
Co. v. United Transportation Union.59 The case involved a labor
dispute between a railroad and its union. Under the Railway Labor
Act of 1926, parties to a railroad labor dispute were required to
maintain the status quo while certain dispute resolution procedures
set forth in the Act were being exhausted. 60 The Supreme Court
explained in its opinion that the "Act established rather elaborate
machinery for negotiation, mediation, voluntary arbitration, and
conciliation. ' '61 The Court then referenced these mechanisms on the
next page of the opinion by referring to them together as "dispute
settlement procedures.' 62 A review of other Supreme Court decisions
from this period shows that it was common for the Justices to refer to
arbitration as a "dispute settlement procedure" or "dispute settlement
mechanism." The Court sometimes modified the phrase with an
adjective to read "private dispute settlement mechanisms." 63
58

The placement of one or more nouns before another noun can suffice to

convert the former into adjectival modifiers of the latter, and that is true of our
"nounal phrase." At bottom, there is a procedure or mechanism, and it is used for
the settlement of disputes. The phrase is inherently encompassing and broad. It
fairly describes all types of dispute resolution, including courts. This makes the
separate modifier "informal" important, and it is to emphasize its significance that
the phrase has been separated into two components for purposes of analysis.
59 Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S.
142 (1969) (argued on Oct. 20, 1969).

61

I at 143.
Id.
Id. at 148-49.

62

Id. at 150.

63 See, e.g., Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 406 U.S. 320, 325

(1972) (referring to the Railway Labor Act's procedures, including its arbitration
mechanism, as "dispute settlement procedures"); Buffalo Forge Co. v. United
Steelworkers of America, 428 U.S. 397, 405, 407 (1974) (suit brought under Labor
Management Relations Act; referring to arbitration mechanisms as "dispute
settlement procedures," "private dispute settlement mechanisms" and "settlement
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Following the Supreme Court's 1960 landmark "Steelworkers
Trilogy" decisions, federal courts were frequently called upon to
effectuate the "federal policies favoring peaceable settlement of labor
disputes through arbitration. ' '64 During this era, labor arbitration often
defined the context in which courts used the word "arbitration" and
its synonyms such as "private dispute settlement procedurCs." 65 It is
reasonable to conclude that the members of Congress who enacted
and supervised the labor laws were accustomed during the relevant
time to use "arbitration" and "dispute settlement procedures"
interchangeably, just as our courts were. 66
procedures"). This was true of courts throughout the federal system. See, e.g., Ill.
Cent. R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 443 F.2d 136, 144 (7th Cir.
1971) (referring to arbitration mechanisms as "dispute settlement procedures");
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. S. Pacific Co., 447 F.2d
1127, 1131 (5th Cir. 1971) (same); Smith v. Pittsburgh Gas and Supply Co., 464
F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1972) (same).
64 48A AM. JUR. 2D, Labor and Labor Relations § 3352, at 525 (1994). The
Supreme Court's 1960 labor law decisions enforcing arbitration provisions
advanced the interests of that party in the labor-management field that had
historically lacked equal power. Whereas prior to the enactment of the National
Labor Relations Act of 1935, "management, with few exceptions, was able to
dominate and exercise unilateral control over most internal plant matters," in the
quarter century that followed, labor unions gained power and forged collective
bargaining agreements that "contained clauses by which many controversies were
submitted to arbitration and the power of the firm waned." Irving Kovarsky,
Comment: The Enforcement of Agreements to Arbitrate, 14 VAND. L. REV. 1105
(1961). The reason this is worthy of comment is that the Supreme Court in the last
two decades has, in its body of FAA case law, consistently reached results that
have advanced the interests of those parties with superior economic power. The
Magnuson-Moss/FAA issue confronts a court with the question of whether
achieving such a result in this context might not be of great concern since
consumers have no power whatsoever to challenge the terms of a product warranty.
65 The interest of the bench and the bar was focused on labor arbitration

through the 1950s, and less attention was paid to commercial arbitration. In June
1957, the editors of the Vanderbilt Law Review decided to devote an entire issue to
the subject of arbitration. See 10 VAND. L. REV. 649 (1957). They noted that
"[t]wenty years ago" even a single "article on arbitration would have been an
oddity in a law review." Id. at 649. Most of the articles in that June 1957 issue
focused on labor arbitration.
66 We have direct evidence that Congress knew about such decisions as
Detroit & Toledo Shore Line Railroad Co. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142
(1969). This was a time when a "nationwide cessation of essential rail
transportation services" was threatened due to a labor dispute. Railroad LaborManagement Dispute - 1970: Hearings Before House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970). The members were fearful that
a nationwide strike could cripple the Nation's economy, and were displeased that
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As with the judiciary, it was common for legal scholars to
treat arbitration as a "dispute settlement procedure" or "mechanism."
This was as true of commercial arbitration as it was of labor
arbitration. Often rather than using the precise nounal phrase, they
would use equivalent verbal formulations like "a method of dispute
settlement. ' 6 This was not only the case with legal scholars, but also
with the leading arbitration association, which gave its 1970
dictionary on arbitration this subtitle: "A Concise Encyclopedia of
Peaceful Dispute Settlement." 68 Lexicographers of the English
language and encyclopedia writers also described arbitration in this
way.69
the dispute settlement procedures of the Railway Labor Act had failed because of
the "public-be-damned attitude" of labor and management. Id. at 27. The
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, which included such congressmen
as Rep. John E. Moss who chaired the Subcommittee hearings on the MagnusonMoss legislation, assessed the efficacy of the dispute settlement procedures in the
Railway Labor Act in a series of crucial hearings in March and April of 1970. The
hearing transcripts show such cases as Detroit & Toledo Shore Line Railroad Co.,
then reported at 38 LAW WEEK 4033, were put before the members. See, e.g., id. at
239.
67 The principal treatise on commercial arbitration was MARTIN DOMKE, THE
LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1968). Said to be the first
"substantial" and "scholarly" treatise on arbitration to be published in 15 years in
American Arbitration Association, Readings in Arbitration, 23 ARB. J. 54, 55
(1968), this book described arbitration often as a "method of dispute settlement."
See MARTIN DOMKE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 5
(1968) ("nobody should be bound to resort to arbitration unless he has previously
agreed to that method of dispute settlement") (emphasis added); see also James A.
Dobkin, Arbitrabilityof Patent Disputes Under The U.S. Arbitration Act, 23 ARB.
J. 1, 17 (1968) (describing arbitration as a "common mode of settlement" and
advocating its increased use "to settle" patent law disputes); Case Comment,
Commercial Arbitration - Sherman Antitrust Act - Antitrust Violation Held
Inappropriatefor Arbitration, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 279, 280 (1968) (noting the
"widespread acceptance of arbitration as a means of settling commercial disputes");
Kenneth Cushman, Arbitration and State Law, 23 ARB. J. 162 (1968) ("The use of
arbitration as a method for the settlement of disputes has emerged as a major force
in the construction industry."); Frank D. Emerson, History of Arbitration Practice
and Law, 19 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 155, 164 (1970) (describing arbitration as "a
dynamic institution for the peaceful settlement of discord, differences, and
disputes").
68 AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

AND ITS TERMS69

LABOR-

COMMERCIAL-

A

DICTIONARY OF ARBITRATION

INTERNATIONAL,

title page (1970).

English language dictionaries defined the word arbitrate as "[t]o submit to

settlement or judgment by arbitration," showing that common usage of the term
involved the concept of a device used for the "settlement" of disputes. THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 87 (1969). The
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Obviously of great importance here is the adjective
"informal." Since the nounal phrase is a broad one that can plainly be
read to encompass all methods whereby people resolve, or "settle,"
their disputes, the statutory phrase necessarily takes much of its
meaning from the word "informal." It bears emphasizing that
arbitration has consistently been described as an informal procedure
by courts, lawyers, and everyone else, including the writers of books
for the general public, both during the relevant time 70 and throughout
its history. Indeed, the chief virtue of arbitration is its informality,
as this is what ensures that it72is "much cheaper and much faster than
even the simplest litigation."
encyclopedias of the period also used the language of the courts in treating
arbitration as a mechanism for "settling disputes." For instance, THE COLUMBIA
ENCYCLOPEDIA (3d ed. 1964), had no listing for "arbitration" but did have an entry
for "industrial arbitration," which it defined as a "method of settling disputes" in

the labor relations context. THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 95 (3d ed. 1964).
70 Judges routinely used the adjective "informal" during this period to refer to
"arbitration" in order to distinguish it from the "formal" processes in our courts of
law. See, e.g., Symphony Fabric Corp. v. Bemson Silk Mills, Inc., 229 N.Y.S.2d
200, 203 (1962) (Eager, J., dissenting) (describing the "informal manner" of
arbitration proceedings); Ballantine Books, Inc. v. Capital Distributing Co., 302
F.2d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 1962) ("among the virtues of arbitration which presumably
have moved the parties to agree upon it are speed and informality"); Northwest
Airlines v. Air Line Pilots Int'l, 442 F.2d 251, 254 (8th Cir. 1971) (citing the
"informality of arbitration proceedings" as one of the reasons they are conducive to
dispute settlement). So did legal scholars. See, e.g., William Jabine, The Statute of
Limitations and Arbitration in Connecticut, 19 ARB. J. 206 (1964) (noting "[a]n
atmosphere of informality has surrounded arbitration proceedings ever since their
inception some two hundred years ago"); Note, Procedure Under Title VII, 84
HARV. L. REV. 1195, 1210 (1971) ("both federal labor law and Title VII are
intended to encourage resort to grievance, arbitration, and other informal machinery
to resolve industrial disputes") (emphasis added). In Martin Mayer's popular book
The Lawyers, he described "arbitration" using the expression "less formal."
American Arbitration Association, Readings in Arbitration, 23 ARB. J. 54 (1968)
("For private law purposes, less formal means of adjustment were required and
were eventually discovered in arbitration, which has ousted the modem American
courts from most cases of the sort Mansfield heard.") (quoting MARTIN MAYER,
THE LAWYERS (Harper Collins 1967)).
71 Several authors have traced the history of arbitration back to the Greeks and

the Romans. See, e.g., Sabra A. Jones, Historical Development of Commercial
Arbitration in the United States, 12 MINN. L. REV. 240, 242-43 (1928). Cicero, in
his oration for Quintus Rescius, distinguished between a "trial" and an "arbitration"
by describing the former as "[e]xact, clear cut, frank," and the latter as "[g]entle,
fair." Id. at 243.
72 Stephen Vladick, Book Review, 4 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1021, 1022 (1966); see
also Alvin L. Goldman, A ProposedArbitrationAct for Kentucky, 22

ARB.

J. 193,
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Because a word like "informal" refers to the relative quality
of a thing and does not name a thing, it had in 1969, as it does now, a
threshold elasticity of meaning made definite both by what it
qualifies and what it distinguishes.7 3 The word "informal" was used
in "informal dispute settlement procedures" in order to contrast these
dispute resolution procedures from courts of law, in the same way
"informal" is used to describe one of the prime beneficial and
distinguishing features of arbitration - that it is faster, cheaper and
less complex than the formal adjudicative processes of the courts.
One might argue that arbitrations can be made either "formal"
or "informal," and this is a truism arising from the relative nature of
those words. A particular arbitration mechanism may be more formal
than another. An arbitration procedure might be constructed to mimic
as much as possible the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, and a
relatively "formal" type of arbitration or "dispute settlement
procedure" could thereby be created. Apart from the fact that no one
likely would intend to thwart the relative speed, inexpensiveness and
simplicity of nonjudicial dispute resolution devices in such a way, 74
the essential point here is that even if one attempted to do so, it would
be impossible to make any nonjudicial redress mechanism as
"formal" as a court of law, which finds both its legitimacy and its
power in its constitutionalcharacter. As Professor Sturges observed:
Arbitrators, as distinguished from judges, are not appointed
by the sovereign, are not paid by it, nor are they sworn to
any allegiance. Arbitrators exercise no constitutional
jurisdiction or like role in the judicial systems - state or
196 (1967) (quoting Vladick). In the Magnuson-Moss Act, Congress described
"informal dispute settlement procedures" as something that would "fairly and
expeditiously" resolve disputes. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(1) (2000). This emphasis
on the speed of such procedures makes the phrase one that refers to a mechanism
possessing the same characteristic that was routinely attributed to arbitration during
the time. See Goldman, supra, at 196 ("[A]rbitration is also a relatively speedy and
informal process."); James T. Halverson, Arbitration and Antitrust Remedies, 30
ARB. J.25, 29 (1975) ("What does arbitration offer as an antitrust remedy? Most
important, it is a procedure for the quick, inexpensive resolution of disputes.").
73A good example of this is found in Note, Translating Sympathy for
Deceived Consumers into Effective Programsfor Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REV.

395, 437 (1966), where the author describes small claims courts as "informal"
procedures, which they are, relatively speaking, when compared to court
mechanisms that apply to ordinary civil actions.
74 As Judge Learned Hand wrote, the "purpose of arbitration is essentially to
escape from judicial trial." Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Louis Bossert & Sons, Inc.,
62 F.2d 1005, 1005 (2d Cir. 1933).
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national. 75
Given all of the foregoing it is not surprising that a review of
the writings of the legal scholars published during the same year that
Senator Magnuson first introduced the phrase on the floor of the
Senate uncovers evidence that the phrase "informal dispute
settlement mechanisms" was used as a generic expression to
encompass "arbitration. ' '76 The expression was not merely a synonym
for arbitration, but rather a phrase that included arbitration within the
scope of its meaning. At its essence, like private arbitration
mechanisms, "informal dispute settlement mechanisms" described a
category of dispute resolution devices distinguished from court
processes.
To understand further why this is so, and to answer the
question of why Senator Magnuson did not simply use the word
"arbitration," we need to examine the state of alternative dispute
resolution at the time.
B. Status of Nonjudicial Redress Mechanisms at the Time.
Alternative dispute resolution in 1969 consisted of labor
arbitration and commercial arbitration.77 Efforts to embrace
75Sturges, supra note 31, at 1046.
76 See, e.g., Alfred W. Blumrosen, LaborArbitration, EEOC Conciliation,and
Discrimination in Employment, 24 ARB. J. 88, 90 (1969) (describing arbitration,
mediation, and conciliation as "informal dispute settlement mechanisms"). In the
1970s it was not uncommon in the law journals for persons to use the adjective
"informal" to distinguish resolution mechanisms from "conventional judicial
dispute resolution," Note, Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 905, 909 (1979), and in
doing so they would employ phrasing like that employed in the Magnuson-Moss
Act to describe the non-judicial mechanisms. See id. at 909 ("What is needed is a
set of 'jurisdictional' principles that delimit those areas in which informal disputeresolution techniques are both workable and permissible.... A key consideration,
of course, is the extent to which we may add structure, consistency and authority to
its resolution in an informal forum."). See also state statutes cited infra note 187
(employing the phrase "informal dispute settlement procedure" and defining it to
include "arbitration").
77 The history of commercial arbitration can be briefly traced for these
purposes from the 1920s. In 1920, the New York legislature enacted legislation that
had been prepared and presented to it by the Chamber of Commerce of the State of
New York, working with the New York Bar Association. See Jones, supra note 71,
at 248. This bill made "an agreement to arbitrate a controversy arising in the future
between the parties to a contract... valid, enforceable and irrevocable." Id. at 249.
Prior to this time, arbitration had frequently been used in the commercial setting
through trade associations that made membership carry with it a duty to arbitrate
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alternatives to the customary judicial dispute settlement procedure in
certain other areas were in their infancy.7
The effort to encourage non-traditional dispute settlement
mechanisms outside the arenas of labor and commercial arbitration,
an undertaking that was to become known in the 1980s as the
"alternative dispute resolution" or "ADR" movement, essentially
embraced two initiatives. 79 First, there were efforts to use new
dispute settlement techniques within the court system. This "courtannexed" or "judicial" arbitration was often used to facilitate
resolution of "small claims." 8° "Small claims" courts, designed to be
grievances among members. Id. at 248. See also Katherine Van Wezel Stone,
Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under The FederalArbitration Act, 77 N.
CAROLINA L. REV. 931, 935 (1999) ("In the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century, arbitration in the United States expanded along with the growth of trade
associations."). But, "the trade associations could make arbitration agreements
binding only on their members," and problems arose "when members of two
organizations which had arbitration rules wanted to arbitrate." Jones, supra, at 248.
The New York legislation, the first in the country of its type, was aimed at solving
those problems. Groups like the Chamber of Commerce then urged state
legislatures to enact laws based on a uniform statute modeled on the New York
law, and they sought what became the FAA to ensure the arbitration of disputes
arising out of maritime and interstate commerce transactions. Id. at 250. By the
1960s about half the states had arbitration statutes in place. See, e.g., Goldman,
supra note 72, at 193 (noting that "some twenty-odd" states along with Kentucky
had adopted statutes patterned on the Uniform Arbitration Act). When the National
Institute for Consumer Justice issued a 1973 report that shall be discussed, see infra
text accompanying notes 133-38, it noted that even at that late date in "some states
only agreements made after the dispute has arisen are enforceable." See NATIONAL
INSTITUTE FOR CONSUMER JUSTICE, REDRESS OF CONSUMER GRIEVANCES REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CONSUMER JUSTICE 9 (1973).
78

See Frank E. A. Sander, Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution: An

Overview, 37 UNIV. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1985) ("Beginning in the late sixties,
American society witnessed an extraordinary flowering of interest in alternative
forms of dispute settlement.").
79 Here we shall make a distinction between "ideas" and reality. There were
many ideas about how alternative methods of dispute settlement might be extended
to new dispute areas at this time. Take as an example the attempt by some to make
medical malpractice cases resolvable through arbitration "agreements," i.e., the
forms people sign on admission to the hospital. Stanley D. Henderson, Arbitration
and Medical Services: Securing the Promise to Arbitrate Malpractice, 28 ARB. J.
14 (1973). But, we are more concerned here with what was happening and less
with what was proposed.
'oThe practice of developing "small claims" courts dates back to at least the
1930s. See Herbert B. Evans and William A. Bulman, Small Claims and
Arbitration - ParallelAlternative Methods of Dispute Resolution, 3 PACE L. REV.
183, 184-86 (1983) (describing the small claim procedure used in the New York
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the "people's court," 81 were themselves a form of alternative dispute
resolution mechanism in the broad sense because they were
alternatives
to the judicial processes that had traditionally been
82
used.
A second initiative, related to what was going on in the
courts, was in the area of non-judicialdispute settlement for claims of
low dollar value that made the costliness of litigation seem
problematic. This initiative appears to have involved the actual
establishment of only one final product, the development of a
"neighborhood justice center" by the American Arbitration
Association in Philadelphia in 1969. With funding from the Ford
Foundation, the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") created a
"Center for Dispute Settlement" in 1968. The Philadelphia program,
which arbitrated small consumer-merchant claims, was its
"prototype. ' ' 84 This prototype was a complete failure. Not a single
consumer-merchant dispute was successfully arbitrated during the
first nine months of the program. 85 According to one commentator,
the "major reason for the Center's dismal lack of success in utilizing
the arbitration technique was the frequent unwillingness of merchants
to submit themselves to the forum - the one essential prerequisite to

municipal courts in the 1930s).
8' Barbara Yngvesson & Patrica Hennessey, Small Claims, Complex Disputes:

A Review of the Small Claims Literature, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 219, 268 (1979)
(observing that small claims courts were intended to provide a "more effective
system of justice for the 'average' American citizen"). Often these small claim
procedures began with the best of intentions but then failed to realize their promise.
See the captivating study of Baltimore's "rent court" prepared by Professor Barbara
Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participationand Subordination of Poor Tenants'
Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 (1992).

An important program that was started in 1952 and that attracted the
attention of legal scholars by the early 1960s was Pennsylvania's court-annexed
program of arbitrating small claims, initially those for not more than $1,000 in
claimed damages, and then with a 1957 statutory amendment, those for not more
82

than $2,000. Maurice Rosenberg & Myra Schubin, Trial by Lawyer: Compulsory
Arbitrationof Small Claims in Pennsylvania, 74 HARV. L. REV. 448, 450 (1961).
83 Thomas L. Eovaldi & Joan E. Gestrin, Justice for Consumers: The

Mechanisms of Redress, 66 Nw. U. L. REV. 281, 310 (1971).
84id.
85 Id.

Excepting those cases where consumers were referred to attorneys or

service agencies,

only forty-five

consumer-merchant disputes were finally

administered, or "closed," during the first nine months. Of these, "not one was
successfully arbitrated." Id.
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86

the forum.",
Various other alternative dispute resolution procedures that
were created circa 1969-1971, such as the Major Appliance

Consumer Action Panel,87 were established by industries as a way to
avoid the Magnuson-Moss legislation. These programs were also
unsuccessful, as is discussed below.
Although writings began to emerge about the possibility of

devisino non-judicial dispute settlement techniques for consumer
claims,

the field was inchoate and the ideas as to how new non-

judicial redress mechanisms could be developed to handle consumer
claims were not fully formed. Indeed, when the National Institute for
Consumer Justice issued its 1973 report, it stated "consumer
arbitration is basically new and untested." 89 This indeterminacy as to
exactly what such alternative procedures for the arbitration of
consumer claims would look like, how they would be funded, and
how they would be administered, continued for the next decade and a
half. 90 This is why Congress elected to use a broad and encompassing
86

id.

87

This industry-created mechanism for dispute settlement is described in the

context of the treatment of the Magnuson-Moss legislative history. See infra note
98.
88 See, e.g., Eovaldi & Gestrin, supra note 83; Mary Gardiner Jones & Barry
B. Boyer, Improving the Quality of Justice in the Marketplace: The Needfor Better
Consumer Remedies, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 357 (1972).
89 NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CONSUMER JUSTICE,

90

supra note 77, at 8.

See Robben W. Fleming, Reflections on the ADR Movement, 34 CLEV. ST.

L. REV. 519, 522 (1986) ("As has already been stated, all the alternatives to
litigation lie somewhere along an axis of negotiation through adjudication. The
form which a procedure may take is limited only by the imagination of the people
involved."). Judge Harry T. Edwards noted:
Because the ADR movement is still in its formative stage, there is
much to learn about the feasibility of alternatives to litigation. ADR is,
as yet, a highly speculative endeavor. We do not know whether ADR
programs can be adequately staffed and funded over the long-term;
whether private litigants will use ADR in lieu of or merely in addition
to litigation; what effect it may have on our judicial caseload; whether
we can avoid problems of 'second class' justice for the poor; and
whether we can avoid the improper resolution of public law questions
in wholly private fora.
Edwards, supra note 56, at 683 (emphasis added). Even in 1979, Congress was still
trying to figure out how to go about developing dispute resolution mechanisms that
could be used generally to provide an "expeditious and inexpensive" way to resolve
consumer and minor disputes. See Note, Dispute Resolution Act Passed, 35 ARB. J.
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phrase, "informal dispute settlement procedures," because it did not
know what precise forms these procedures might eventually take.

V. The Pertinent Legislative History
A. The 1970-1971 Legislative Activity
On January 20, 1970, five days of hearings commenced
before the Consumer Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate's Committee
on Commerce on Senator Magnuson's Senate Bill 3074.91 Senator
Frank E. Moss chaired the Consumer Subcommittee. In his opening
remarks on Bill 3074, he explained that one aim of the legislation
was to ensure that if a warrantor or guarantor of a consumer product
failed to honor its obligations, the consumer would have either a
means of redress through the judicial system or a way of securing
relief through "informal dispute settlement mechanisms."92 He stated:
If the guaranteed product or component malfunctions, the
guarantor is required to repair, or replace if repair is not
possible or cannot be timely made, the malfunctioning
component within a reasonable time and without charge. If
the maker of the guarantee fails to perform his duties, the
consumer has quick and effective means of making the
corporation respond either through court action where his
attorney's fees are paid
93 for or through informal dispute
mechanisms.
settlement
This bifurcation of remedies into two categories - judicial
18 (1980) (describing the Dispute Resolution Act of 1979 that provided a $1
million annual appropriation for five years to study dispute resolution techniques
for use in "consumer and minor disputes").
91 ConsumerProducts GuarantyAct Hearings,supra note 28, at 1.
92

Id. at 2.

Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 165. The two modes of relief - formal
court actions and informal dispute settlement procedures - were linked to one
another in that the potential for a court action was the thing that members of
Congress and their counsel believed would prompt industry to create "informal
dispute settlement mechanisms." S. Lynn Sutcliffe, staff counsel to the Committee
of Commerce, noted in his statement before the Consumer Subcommittee that
manufacturers and retailers would have an "incentive" to "create informal dispute
settlement mechanisms" since under S. 3074 "the consumer is given a meaningful
right for a lawsuit, because reasonable attorney's fees are awarded him if he is
successful." ConsumerProducts GuarantyAct Hearings,supra note 28, at 21.
93
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redress mechanisms and "informal dispute settlement mechanisms" represented a common way of expressing the available forms of
relief. It was consistently done throughout the legislative
process, as
94
the hearing transcripts and congressional reports show.
The efforts of the representatives of American industry to
convince Congress that businesses could regulate themselves were a
prime feature of the hearings that took place over the next four
years. 95 Representatives of industry appeared before Senator Moss'
Subcommittee in January 1970 to assert that Congress should refrain
from acting because industry had matters well in hand. For example,
A.S. Yohalem, the Director of the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States, commented as follows:
In sum, Mr. Chairman, we believe that voluntary progress
has been sufficient to warrant a continued extension of the
legislative moratorium on warranties and guarantees .... It
is not more laws that the consumer wants: it is solutions of
his problems. If voluntarism in a competitive marketplace
will produce a workable and satisfactory solution to the
warranties problems - and we believe it will - then
consumers96 would be less well served by legislative
remedies.

There had been two features to industry's "voluntary

94 See, e.g., Consumer Warranty Protection - 1973 Hearings,supra note 28,
at 62-63 (statement of Sen. James T. Broyhill) (explaining that bill aims at
ensuring that "these consumer disputes can be settled through more informal
dispute settlement procedures, rather than the courts"); see also S. REP. No. 93151, at 16 (1973) (explaining that there were two anticipated avenues of redress for
the consumer, "informal dispute settlement mechanisms" and "legal remedies made
economically feasible because of provision for recovery of reasonable attorney's
fees based on actual time expended"); id. at 23 (consumers "may resort to formal
adversary proceedings with reasonable attorney's fees available if successful in the
litigation (including settlement)"; stating unequivocally that following use of an
"informal dispute settlement procedure" consumers "would not be prevented from
seeking formal judicial relief following such utilization") (emphasis added); S. REP.
No. 93-1408, at 26-27 (1974).
95 See Consumer Products Guaranty Act Hearings, supra note 28, at 1
(statement of Sen. Moss as to how "[i]ndustry scrambled to put its own house in
order"); see also id. at 130 (statement of Winston H. Pickett, Associate counsel,
General Electric Co.) (explaining that "the probability of intense and proper
concern by Congress with this whole problem was a continuing stimulus" to
industry's self-regulation efforts).
96 Consumer Products GuarantyAct Hearings,supra note 28, at 149.
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progress." The first was the effort by some groups to teach companies
how to make their warranties less unfair and deceptive.97 The other
aspect was to begin devising mechanisms whereby consumers could
have their claims of warranty breach resolved without judicial or
governmental involvement. Generally speaking, these mechanisms
shared three characteristics: they were voluntary (as far as the
manufacturers were concerned), they were not subject to any
governmental supervision, and they did98 not require the warrantor to
do something that it did not want to do.
In the view of the members of the Nixon administration who
appeared before Senator Moss' Subcommittee in 1970, the efforts by
industry had not accomplished very much to solve the warranty
problem. Caspar W. Weinberger, Chairman of the FTC, told the
senators: "it is apparent that there has been some effort by industry to
improve warranties and service in the major appliance field," but he
concluded that "it is unlikely that collective voluntary action will
provide an effective solution to warranty abuses." 99

The senators on the Consumer Subcommittee heard two very
different reactions to the provision in section 16 of Senate Bill 3074
that encouraged the creation of "informal dispute settlement
97 See, e.g., id. at 76 (1970) (statement of George P. Lamb, General
Counsel,
Association of Home Appliance Manufacturers).

98 Typical was the "Complaint Exchange" that had been developed by the
Association of Home Appliance Manufacturers ("AHAM"). Described by
AHAM's counsel as "the association's most important action in helping to resolve
complaints that arise under warranties," the "Exchange" apparently served
primarily as a place for "transmitting" the complaints of consumers that found their
way into the offices of the congressmen, the President, and "whomever." Consumer
Products Guaranty Act Hearings, supra note 28, at 77 (statement of George P.
Lamb). The "Exchange" would then follow through, supposedly, to see if it could
get the warrantor to solve the problem voluntarily. Later in the year, at House
hearings, Mr. Lamb proudly reported on how a successor to the "Exchange," called
the Major Appliance Consumer Action Panel ("MACAP"), had worked to resolve
"125" warranty complaints, and how the mechanism had "eight persons who work
professionally in consumer-interest fields." Warrantiesand GuarantiesHearings,
supra note 28, at 130-131, 140. The small number of consumer warranty
grievances resolved by MACAP could have not been reassuring to the congressmen
whose offices were being inundated with many thousands of angry letters from
constituents. Rep. John E. Moss commented that his office alone had received some
1,000 complaints with regard to consumer products. Id. at 143. See generally Jones
& Boyer, supra note 88, at 372 (concluding that an "MACAP-type mediation
effort" operated by industry "seems inherently incapable of providing a full answer
to the consumer grievance problem").
99 ConsumerProducts GuarantyAct Hearings,supra note 28, at 8.

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 15: 3

mechanisms." Industry representatives generally opposed it because
it "injected" governmental regulation into the affairs of businesses. 100
Consumer groups thought the provision did not go far enough, since
it did not "mandate" the creation of such mechanisms, but only
encouraged them.' 0 Both sides, however, made clear to the
Subcommittee that they understood "arbitration" procedures were
encompassed by the phrase "informal dispute settlement
mechanisms" as used in Senate Bill 3074.102
The Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance of the House
of Representatives Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
began hearings on warranty legislation in September 1970.103 Seven
separate warranty bills had been introduced in the House in 19691970, two of which were like S.3074.104 Members of the House also
had developed three other types of legislation that omitted the
100The

industry view on the "informal dispute settlement" component of the

legislation was expressed by George P. Lamb of AHAM:
AHAM and other trade associations have repeatedly demonstrated their
willingness to cooperate with governmental agencies to advance the
consumer's interest. They have demonstrated their willingness to assist
in seeing that consumer complaints are answered satisfactorily. To
require governmental supervision of our effort, and the efforts of all
independent organizations that undertake to provide procedures for
arbitratingconsumer claims would delay and inhibit their work. What
governmental agency could undertake to carry out with dispatch the
supervision of voluntary procedures that might be established by the
industries that now supply the consumer goods with which S. 3074 is
concerned? We think none.
Consumer Products Guaranty Act Hearings, supra note 28, at 79 (emphasis
added).
101 In his prepared statement, David A Swankin, the Washington
Representative of the Consumers Union, wrote:
The bill as written merely encourages, as a matter of policy, that
informal dispute settlement procedures be created. Why should the
Congress stop at that?... We can hardly realistically expect consumers
to flood the courts with law suits [sic] to make this law work. That is
why we put so much importance in mandating a system of negotiation
and arbitration.
Consumer Products Guaranty Act Hearings, supra note 28, at 259 (emphasis
added).
12 See supra notes 100 and 101.
103

Warrantiesand GuarantiesHearings, supra note 28.

104

Id. at 44 (describing H.R. 18758, H.R. 19293, and S. 3074 as "similar").
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provisions on "informal dispute settlement mechanisms," including
H.R. 10690. °5
The FTC strongly opposed the failure of these bills to
encourage creation of informal dispute settlement mechanisms.
Directing his comments to the "Buyer's Remedies" section of H.R.
10690, Miles W. Kirkpatrick, who had succeeded Caspar Weinberger
as Chairman of the FTC, criticized the bill's omission of a nonjudicial remedy for consumers. He explained that given the costs of
formal litigation, an "arbitration"procedure should be included in
the bill. Noting that an arbitration remedy could be "formulated and
administered in a variety of ways," he urged delegating to the
"administering agency" the power "to lay down the standards to
which this arbitrationremedy must conform." 106
In March 1971, Congress held more hearings on warranty
legislation. Senator Frank E. Moss' Subcommittee received
testimony on S. 986, which contained as "Title I" a bill that was
almost identical to S. 3074 passed without a dissenting vote in the
Senate on July 1, 1970.107 Section 110(a) of S. 986 contained the
policy statement favoring the establishment of "informal dispute
settlement mechanisms." r° 8 In his questioning of FTC Chairman
Kirkpatrick, Senator Moss distinguished between consumer lawsuits
and FTC administrative actions to enforce warranties, on the one
hand, and informal dispute settlement procedures, on the other. The
former were described as "formal dispute settlement mechanisms,"
and they were, according to Senator Moss aimed at "encourag[ing]
industry to develop workable informal settlement procedures. ' 09 The
FTC Chairman concurred with Chairman Moss' view, expressing the
105

Id. at 16-43 (text of H.R. 10690). H.R. 10690 was identical to H.R. 12656

and H.R. 16782. Id. at 16.
'06

Warranties and Guaranties Hearings, supra note 28, at 64 (emphasis

added).
107 Consumer Product Warrantiesand Improvement Act Hearings, supra note

36, at 1-2.
108Id. at 14 (text of S. 986).
109Id.

at 44. It is noteworthy that Sen. Moss used the phrase "dispute

settlement mechanisms" to refer to FTC enforcement actions and private lawsuits,
revealing that the phrase "dispute settlement procedure" or "mechanism" was used
to describe any dispute resolution mechanism, and that, just as today's phrase is
modified by the word "alternative" to distinguish certain procedures from legal
actions, the phrase "dispute settlement procedure" circa 1971 was modified by the
word "informal" to distinguish certain procedures from the adjudicative processes
in courts of law.
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belief that industry would be motivated to create informal dispute
settlement mechanisms, "rather than permitting the matter to go into
the courts."' 10
This Senate Subcommittee hearing demonstrates the
Magnuson-Moss Act's treatment of "informal dispute settlement
mechanisms" and their meaning. S. 986 as it was originally drafted,
like its predecessor S. 3074, contained the language that such
mechanisms were "encourage[d]" by Congress and that they "should
be created by suppliers in cooperation with independent and
governmental entities and should be supervised by some
governmental or other impartial body."''' But, there was nothing in
S. 3074 or in S.-986, as it was first drafted, that provided for the FTC
to create rules as to informal dispute settlement procedures. In their
original 1970 form, these bills contained what was really a policy
statement that had not yet been fully fleshed out.
At the March 9, 1971 hearing before Sen. Moss'
Subcommittee, the process of adding meat to the bones of this aspect
of the Senate bill began. The FTC Chairman, in his statement to the
subcommittee, suggested that Section 110(a) of S. 986 be changed to
permit the FTC to prescribe rules for such dispute settlement
mechanisms.' 12
When Senator Moss' Subcommittee revised Senate Bill 986,
it transformed the provision on "informal dispute settlement
procedures" from a statement of policy into something far more
concrete.' 13 The bill, as reported, differed from the version of S. 986
that had been before the Consumer Subcommittee during the March
1971 hearings. Section 102(a)(10), which had required disclosure in
warranties pursuant to FTC regulations of "[t]he availability of any
informal dispute settlement procedure," now read: "The availability
of any informal dispute settlement procedure offered by the warrantor
and a recital that the purchaser must resort to such procedure before

"0 Id. at 45.

.. Compare id. at 14 (text of S. 986, section I10(a), as it was originally
drafted), with Consumer ProductsGuaranty Act Hearings, supra note 28, at 5 (text
of S. 3074, section 16).
112 Consumer Product Warranties and Improvement Act Hearings, supra note
36, at 34 (statement of Miles W. Kirkpatrick).
113 Following the hearings before the Consumer Subcommittee, on July 16,
1971, the Senate Committee on Commerce published its report on S. 986. See S.
No. 92-269 (1971).

REP.
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pursuing any legal remedies in the courts."' 14 Adopting FTC
Chairman Kirkpatrick's recommendation that the FTC be given
authority over informal dispute settlement procedures, Section 110(a)
was added, stating:
Congress hereby declares it to be its policy to encourage
warrantors to establish procedures whereby consumer
disputes are fairly and expeditiously settled through
informal dispute settlement mechanisms. Such informal
dispute settlement procedures should be created by
suppliers
in cooperation
with
independent
and
governmental entities pursuant to guidelines established by
the Commission. If a supplier incorporates any such
informal dispute settlement procedure in any written
warranty or service contract, such dispute procedure shall
initially be used by any consumer to resolve any complaint
arising under such warranty or service contract. The bona
fide operation of any such dispute procedure shall be
subject to review by the Commission on its own initiative
or upon written complaint filed by any injured party. 115
In tandem with the proposal that the FTC's rule-making
power be enhanced, several senators and Nixon administration
representatives recommended that a formal analysis of the available
mechanisms of dispute settlement be conducted. President Nixon had
first called for such a study in February 1971.116
The most important voice on the Subcommittee on this issue
was that of Senator Marlow W. Cook. 1 7 Senator Cook announced his

Id. at 31. Thus, the concept of informal dispute settlement procedures as
the alternative to the judicial redress mechanism became more fixed.
114

15

Id. at 33-34. These provisions became part of the enacted legislation. See

15 U.S.C. §§ 2302(a)(8), 2310(a)(1) & (2).
116

See

NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CONSUMER JUSTICE, supra note 77, at xi,

where it stated:
The National Institute for Consumer Justice grew out of the President's
consumer address made on February 24, 1971, which called upon

"interested private citizens to undertake a thorough study of the
adequacy of existing procedures for the resolution of disputes arising
out of consumer transactions." The Institute commenced operations in
the summer of 1971 and concluded its work in March of 1973.
117 See S. REP. No. 92-269, at 56 (1971) ("Separate Views of Marlow W.
Cook Regarding S. 986").
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intention to offer "on the floor as an amendment to S. 986" a third
'' 8
section to the bill requiring a "Consumer Remedies Study." 1
Senator Cook made clear his view that "arbitration" was one form of
"informal dispute settlement mechanism," when he stated in his
amendment that it would authorize the Director of the Office of
Consumer Affairs, with the assistance of the Attorney General, to
contact "the National Institute for Consumer Justice" to "conduct a
study or studies of means of improving the grievance-solving
mechanisms and legal remedies of consumers," taking account of
"existing and potential voluntary settlement procedures, including
' 9 The word "arbitration"
arbitration."
was used to mean a subcategory of "voluntary settlement procedures."
S. 986 was brought up for a vote on the floor of the U.S.
Senate on November 8, 1971, and Senator Cook offered his
amendment. 21 0 When S. 986 was passed by a vote of 76 to 2, with 22
not voting, it included the "Consumer Remedies Study."1' 21 Senator
Dole spoke in favor of the amendment, explaining:
At the present time, we have insufficient data on the nature
and frequency of consumer disputes and on the
effectiveness of existing procedures such as small claims
courts, class actions, and private dispute settlement
techniques, 22including arbitration in resolving consumer
grievances.

"

Id. at 63.

1'9 Id.
120

121

(emphasis added).

117

CONG. REC.

39852-53 (Nov. 8, 1971).

Id. at 39876, 39880.

Id. at 39626 (emphasis added). Senator Dole mentioned class actions in his
comment. At this time, hearings were also being conducted by the Senate's
Consumer Subcommittee on the topic of consumer class actions. Consumer Class
Action: Hearings on S. 984, S. 1222, and S. 1378 Before the Consumer Subcomm.
of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971). Industry
representatives opposed this legislation, and in doing so recommended instead
"informal dispute settlement procedures" like arbitration procedures. For example,
Eugene A. Keeney, President of the American Retail Federation, praised the
"National Center for Dispute Settlement of the American Arbitration Association,"
which had set up the "Pennsylvania Consumer Arbitration Service Pilot Program"
in 1971. Id. at 163-66. See supra text accompanying notes 83-86 (discussing the
same). Before the Subcommittee, Mr. Keeney repeatedly described the pilot
arbitration program as an "informal dispute settlement mechanism." See id. at 158,
161 (commending the "use of such informal dispute settlement mechanisms").
122
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B. A Consideration of the Early Senate Report upon Which the
Cases Supporting Arbitration Have Relied
It is now appropriate to discuss the earlier Senate Report, one
sentence of which certain court decisions have treated as the only
relevant legislative history pertaining to this topic. The review thus
far has provided a context in which to consider this report in an
informed way. When S. 3074 was reported back in 1970, it lacked
anything other than a general statement of policy on informal
mechanisms. A 1970 report referring to that early bill stated:
Subsection (a) of this section declares that it is Congress' [s]
intent that warrantors of consumer products cooperate with
government and private agencies to establish informal
dispute settlement mechanisms that take care of consumer
grievances without aid of litigation or formal arbitration.
This subsection 1is23 merely a statement of policy and has no
operative effect.

As previously discussed, the adjective "formal," and its
adjectival counterpoint "informal," were the terms commonly used
by our legislators and their staff counsel during the 1970
deliberations on the Magnuson-Moss Act, as a way of distinguishing
judicial proceedings from private procedures. 24 "Formal arbitration"
in the sentence at issue from S. Rep. No. 91-876 can be properly read
to refer to judicial, or court-supervised, arbitration as opposed to
private contractual arbitration. Grouping "formal arbitration" and
in 1969 would be appropriate where referring to judicial
"litigation"
•• - 125
Judicial arbitration was beginning to be put into wide
arbitration.
use about a decade before 1969.126 It was applied to precisely the sort
of "small claims" Magnuson-Moss was concerned about.
This appears to be the only reasonable interpretation. It is the

123

S. REP. No. 91-876, at 22-23 (1970).

124

See, e.g., Consumer Products Guaranty Act Hearings, supra note 28, at 2

(statement of Sen. Moss treating as the only two forms of relief "informal dispute
settlement mechanisms" and "court action"); id. at 21 (statement of S. Lynn
Sutcliffe); id. at 25 (statement of Sen. Philip A. Hart).
125 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 134-35 (rev. 4th ed. 1968); see also
generally 4 AM. JUR. 2D, Alternative Dispute Resolution § 8, at 73-74 (1994)
("There are two different forms of arbitration: private, or contractual, and judicial
arbitration.").
126 See, e.g., Rosenberg & Schubin, supra note 82, at 450.
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only reading that squares with all of the other things Congress and its
administrative agency were saying at the time about "arbitrations"
being an "informal dispute settlement procedure," such as the abovequoted comments of Senators Cook and Dole, and the statements of
the FTC Chairman Miles W. Kirkpatrick who advocated Congress
delegating to his agency the power "to lay down the standards to
which this arbitration remedy must conform."' 127 It is also the only
reading that is consistent with the other language of Senate Report

91-876. 128
Elsewhere in the Report the author wrote about how the
"consumer should be protected" from warrantors who pretend to be
giving the consumer protections but who are really deceiving the
consumer by using fine print and thereby "taking rights away from
him.'' 129 Why, if Congress was so concerned about protecting
consumers from one-sided and unfair warranty drafting practices that
would divest consumers of rights, and if it was so committed to
ensuring an avenue for legal redress through court action, would the
drafter of this 1970 Senate Report have allowed warrantors to
unilaterally rob consumers of court access through a contractual
provision that provides for a private binding arbitration procedure?
The Southern cases' reading of this sentence cannot be squared with
the fact that no congressman, no senator, no representative of the
federal regulatory agencies, no witnesses from industry or from the
consumer interest groups ever breathed a word suggesting that
private contractual arbitration could be used to shut off completely
the consumer's right to sue. They all viewed contractual arbitration

127

See supra note 106, at 64.

128 The Report explained that in the event of warranty breach, the "purchaser

who is affected by that breach may pursue his existing legal remedies in any court
of competent jurisdiction." S. REP. No. 91-876, at 2. Similarly, the version of S.

3074 contained in this Report stated that "[a]ny person damaged by the failure of a
supplier to comply with any obligations assumed under an express or implied
warranty ... may bring suit" in a court of competent jurisdiction. Id. at 15. These
statements would not be true statements were it possible for the right to sue in a
court of law to be entirely shut off by a warrantor placing a binding arbitration
clause in its written warranty (in its adhesion contract). Congress clearly would not
have said several pages before the sentence at issue that a consumer could go to
court, if that right was subject to the permission of a warrantor who elects to refrain
from drafting its warranty so as to preclude court action. The sentences on pages
two and fifteen would be true, however, and would be consistent with the sentence
in question, if "formal arbitration" on page twenty-three is understood to mean
judicial arbitration as opposed to private contractual arbitration.
129 S. REP. No. 91-876, at 4-5.
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as a form of informal dispute settlement procedure that served as an
alternative to the "formal" processes of our courts 130
of law, including
court-supervised and controlled judicial arbitration.
An additional reason to reject the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit's
interpretation of this sentence is that a year later the Consumer
Subcommittee amended S. 986, the first draft of which had been
modeled on S. 3074, and in its report on the amended bill, the
Subcommittee made clear that its understanding of the word "formal"
was as an adjective to refer to court proceedings. Any ambiguity
assertedly flowing from the single sentence the recent courts have
cited is surely clarified in this later report. In describing the remedies
available to the consumer under section 110 of the revised bill, the
Committee drew a distinction between "formal" dispute settlement
mechanisms and "informal" dispute settlement mechanisms. The
former were described as "litigation," and the meaning of the latter,
given the context,
was private, nonjudicial dispute resolution
3
procedures. 1
C. The National Institute for Consumer Justice Findings
In 1971 the National Institute for Consumer Justice ("NICJ"
or the "Institute") was created to research mechanisms for redressing
consumer grievances. Because it needed time to do its work, the
Magnuson-Moss legislation did not progress in 1972 and early
1973.132

The NICJ's staff recognized that private arbitrations were

130

Note that Senate Report No. 91-876 contains the objections of James T.

Lynn, the General Counsel for the Department of Commerce, at 31-34. Mr. Lynn
argued that the fee-shifting provision of S. 3074 "would lead to a substantial
clogging of already overburdened courts and encourage unjustified claims." Id. at
33. He argued that "informal dispute settlement procedures" should be used
instead, and that court action should not be permitted. Id. Why would he have gone
to this trouble, if the sentence on pages 22-23 of the Report on S. 3074 was to be
understood to mean that "formal arbitration" could at any time be invoked by the

warrantor to prohibit court action?
131 S. REP. No. 92-269, at 20 (1971) (discussing the right to resort to "formal
adversary proceedings with reasonable attorney's fees available after successful
litigation" and differentiating the "litigation" redress mechanism from "informal
dispute settlement procedures established by suppliers"; explaining that after using

the informal procedures, the consumer could resort to "formal legal action")
(emphasis supplied); see also 117 CONG. REC. 39818 (comments of Sen. Moss,
introducing bill on Senate floor on Nov. 8, 1971).
132 See generally 119 CONG. REC. 967 (Jan. 12, 1973).
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"informal" proceedings. The staff s report observed: "The informality
of the arbitration process is in stark contrast to the formal, legalistic
tenor of a court proceeding."' 33 The relative informality of such
procedures would, the NICJ staff wrote, "make it possible for an
individual party, such as a consumer, to present his or ' her
' 34 own case
attorney."
an
of
intervention
the
without
to the arbitrator
But there was a problem with the use of "private voluntary
arbitration programs."' 35 The Institute's staff studied some
"arbitration programs" that "private trade associations" were then
proposing in response to Congress's work. It was concerned that
these programs be subject to close governmental
oversight so that
136
they would be fair and impartial and low cost.
The Institute's members issued a report containing the NICJ's
recommendations on consumer redress mechanisms. 37 It encouraged
arbitration, but stated that it had to be subject to oversight to ensure
its fairness and practical use by consumers: "Making arbitration
'available' would include setting up the machinery for an arbitration
process providing for, inter alia, arbitrators, a convenient method for
initiating arbitration, a fair set of procedures, a location for the
arbitration, incentives to arbitrate, and perhaps most importantly, a
method for funding the arbitration process
so that it is not
38
prohibitively expensive for the litigants.",1
Congress waited for the Institute's recommendations for two
years, and considered them when they were published. 39 Since the

133 NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CONSUMER JUSTICE, STUDIES VOL.
134 Id. at

136

I-I (1973).

64.

Id. at 133.
Id. The NICJ staff's "Recommendations" on how arbitration mechanisms

should be made to work for consumers, found at NICJ, Studies Vol. I-II, at 133
(1973), read in part:
THAT PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION PROGRAMS BE
ENCOURAGED AND EXPANDED. The arbitration programs
proposed by ... private trade associations, are, for the most part, just
beginning to get underway. These efforts will prove to be worthwhile if
they meet uniform standards of impartiality, modest cost, and the like.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CONSUMER JUSTICE, STUDIES, at

added).
137 See
131Id.

NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CONSUMER JUSTICE,

133 (1973) (emphasis

supra note 77.

at 10.

139 See 120 CONG. REC. 55 (Jan. 21, 1974); CURTIS R. REITZ, CONSUMER
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Institute unequivocally advocated the need for governmental
surveillance of private arbitration mechanisms, it is hard to believe
that Congress intended for certain types of dispute settlement
mechanisms to be subject to FTC oversight to ensure fairness, but
also wanted arbitration dispute settlement procedures to operate
outside the Magnuson-Moss regulatory framework.
D. The 1973-1974 Legislative Activity
On January 12, 1973, when Senator Magnuson appeared on
the floor of the U. S. Senate to re-introduce the warranty bill, he said
what all members present knew: that the bill was "not new" and that
he and the Subcommittees of the House and the Senate had been
working on it "for a number of years." 140 The legislative history from
this period is especially important to the task of determining
Congress's intent in five principal respects. First, the members of
Congress, their staff counsel and the witnesses continued during this
period to speak of "arbitration" as something they viewed as an
"informal dispute settlement procedure." 14 1 Second, members of
Congress continued to treat the redress mechanisms available as
consisting of only two types: legal remedies to be secured through
court action and informal dispute settlement procedures. 11 2 Third,
paying heed to the warnings from the National Institute for Consumer
Justice, Congress continued to be preoccupied
with the "fairness" of
143
these privately created mechanisms.
Fourth, the 1973-1974 legislative history makes clear that the
provision in the statute for court access had a critical two-part
function, the second aspect of which makes a reading of the statute to
permit binding arbitration untenable. The first aim was to let
consumers have a means of redress, and the senators and
congressman worked hard to determine (given, for example, the
jurisdictional requirements in the federal courts) how this could

PROTECTION UNDER THE MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT

84 (1978) (noting

Congress's use of "[s]tudies conducted prior to enactment" of the Act).
140 119 CONG. REC. 967 (Jan. 12, 1973). See also Consumer Warranty
Protection- 1973 Hearings, supra note 28, at I (statement of Rep. John E. Moss
on Subcommittee's long and patient work).
141 See,

e.g., Consumer Warranty Protection- 1973 Hearings, supra note 28,

at 120-121 (Prof. Leary discussing need for "a truly independent arbitration").
142See, e.g., statement and Senate Reports cited supra note 94.
143 See,

e.g., S. REP. No. 93-1408, at 26-27 (1974).
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44
practically be done. 1
The second aim was to create a means of "penalizing"
warrantors engaging in sharp commercial practices. On January 12,
1973, Senator Magnuson made this clear on the floor:

If warrantors who did not perform their promises suffered
direct economic detriment, they would have strong
incentives to perform. Therefore there is a need to insure
warrantor performance by monetarily penalizing the
warrantor for non-performance - and awarding that penalty
to the consumer for his loss. One way to effectively meet
this need is by providing for reasonable attorney'sfees and
court costs to successful consumer litigants,
thus making
4
consumer resort to the courts feasible.'
By making warrantors shoulder the costs of litigation and potentially
face paying for all the consumers' attorney's fees, the court access
feature of the legislation would46financially disincentivize warrantors
from breaching their promises. 1
This demonstrates why binding arbitration is directly counter
to what Congress intended. The point appears to raise an interest that
is diametrically opposed to another more obvious congressional aim.
Clearly, the legislative body intended for both consumers and
manufacturers to have a low-cost and speedy alternative dispute
resolution mechanism available to them. In this regard, one could
advance the idea that binding arbitration is consistent with this aim.
Arbitration procedures are generally less expensive and timeconsuming than court processes.
In what appears superficially to be a position inconsistent
with its desire for low-cost and speedy redress mechanisms, Congress
sought to deter egregious warrantor conduct by embracing the costly
and time-consuming nature of formal litigation, by using it as a club
'44 See, e.g., Consumer Warranty Protection - 1973 Hearings,supra note 28,

at 110 (statement of Sen. Bob Eckhardt on how the then existing $10,000
jurisdictional limit would mean federal court access would be limited "to a Cadillac
with a built-in pipe organ sold to the shahs of foreign countries"; Professor Leary
suggesting "[t]here is a Mercedes on the market that would meet that, and a RollsRoyce").

145 119 CONG. REC. 968 (Jan. 12, 1973) (emphasis added).
146 This view was restated in the congressional reports. See, e.g., S. REP. No.
93-151, at 7 (1973) (explaining how the potential for an award of court costs and
attorney's fees to the consumer will meet the "need to insure warrantor
performance by monetarily [sic] penalizing the warrantor for non-performance").
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that would hang over the heads of companies pursuing disreputable
business practices. The club could easily be wielded because of the
statute's fee-shifting provision that would enable lawyers to be
compensated for the reasonable fees incurred in pursuing such
business concerns on behalf of consumers.
The fifth aspect of the 1973-1974 legislative history that
makes clear the error of imputing to Congress an intent to permit a
warrantor's unilateral elimination of court access is the explicit
iteration in Congress's reports that the inequality in bargaining power
in the field of consumer product warranties was a major concern.
Senate Report 93-151, for example, described the "needs" for the
legislation this way:
When the use of a warranty in conjunction with the sale of
a product first became commonplace, it was typically a
concept that the contracting parties understood and
bargained for, usually at arms length. One could decide
whether or not to purchase a product with a warranty, and
bargain for that warranty accordingly. Since then, the
relative bargaining power of those contracting for the
purchase of consumer products has changed radically....
Typically, a consumer today cannot bargain with consumer
product manufacturers to obtain a warranty or to adjust the
terms of a warranty voluntarily offered. Since almost all
consumer products sold today are typically done so with a
contract of adhesion, there is no bargaining over contract
terms. S. 386 attempts to remedy some of the defects
resulting from this gross inequality in bargaining power,
and return the sense of fair play to the warranty field that
as the organizational
has been lost through the years 147
structure of our society has evolved.
Their work done, the Senators and Congressmen who for
years had toiled to protect the rights of America's consumers sent
their Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act to the President, who signed it
into law on January 4, 1975.148

147
148

(1994)).

No. 93-15 1, at 6 (1973).
Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12
S. REP.
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E. Case Law and Scholarly Commentary Ignore the Relevant

Legislative History
Neither the courts nor the legal commentators have ever
closely analyzed the foregoing legislative history to determine
whether Congress intended to preserve for Magnuson-Moss
claimants access to the judicial forum in the face of a binding
arbitration clause. 149 Why did this happen?
The omission in any reported case and in any law review
article to analyze the legislative history could be attributed to the fact
that it is not a simple task to secure and review the material. 5 ' The
legislative history spans five separate sets of congressional hearings,
consists of numerous floor debates, and involved many Senate and

149

See case law cited supra note 10. As for the commentators, see, e.g.,

Wiechens, supra note 33, at 1464, 1469, 1474-75 (asserting in a conclusory way
that the legislative history does not demonstrate that "informal dispute settlement
procedures" and arbitration are the same thing, while ignoring the legislative
history of the statute save for one sentence that is "analyzed" through a conjecture);
Note, Arbitration - Fifth Circuit Holds Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act Claims
Arbitrabal Despite ContraryAgency Interpretation, 116 HARv. L. REV. 1201, 1207
(2003) (uncritically assuming that the FTC's interpretation of the Act is "at odds
with the legislative history" without considering the legislative history); Katherine
R. Guerin, Clash of the Federal Titans: The Federal Arbitration Act v. The
Magnuson-Moss Act - Will the Consumer Win or Lose?, 13 LOY. CONSUMER L.
REV. 4 (2001) (omitting an in-depth analysis of legislative history); Mace E.
Gunter, Note, Can Warrantors Make An End Run? The Magnuson-Moss Act and
Mandatory Arbitration in Written Warranties, 34 GA. L. REV. 1483, 1486-92,
1494-96, 1506 (2000) (arguing against binding arbitration, but relying exclusively
on legislative history reprinted in the United States Code Congressional and
Administrative News and certain comments recorded in 1973 Congressional

Record).
50

There are no computerized legal research services that facilitate review of

congressional hearings, floor debates and reports during the 1969-1974 time
period. The tendency among those few persons who have elected to look at the
legislative history at all has, therefore, been to rely on those parts of it that are
readily available through their having been reprinted in the permanent edition of the
United States Code Congressional and Administrative News ("U.S.C.C.A.N."),
even though they represent but a small percentage of the total legislative history of
Magnuson-Moss. See, e.g., Gunter, supra note 149. In Walton v. Rose Mobile
Homes L.L.C., 298 F.3d 470, 478-79 (5th Cir. 2002), the court stated that
"[binding] arbitration is simply not a part of these [congressional] reports." In
Davis v. Southern Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002), the
court wrote that the Act's legislative history "never directly addresses the role of
binding arbitration." By these comments, relating to certain "congressional reports"
reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N., the courts were referring to a tiny fraction of the
complete legislative history.
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House reports. One must go to a federal depository and spend several
days to conduct the review. But standing alone this seems an
unsatisfactory explanation.
A second, and far more important, reason is that,
notwithstanding the Supreme Court's direction that the FAA issue be
assessed by considering a statute's text, purposes and legislative
history, there may be something operative in the minds of the jurists
and legal commentators that makes the earnest and disciplined
pursuit of this analytical process - and it is nothing other than the
well-known analytical process of statutory interpretation - seem
unimportant. What could that something be?
Courts and commentators have elected to construe Supreme
Court precedents like McMahon1 51 to enunciate a policy favoring the
enforcement of arbitration clauses, and while this may be an
undeniable conclusion, they have gone further and assumed that the
policy should strongly influence any analysis of a subsequent act of
Congress. This flawed approach invariably begins with an assertion
such as, "[i]n every case the Supreme Court has considered involving
a statutory right that does not explicitly preclude arbitration, it has
upheld the application of the FAA."' 1 Then the actual statutory
interpretation is informed by references to the policy "favoring
arbitration." This is why, for example, the Eleventh Circuit could not
simply perform an analysis of the legislative history of the
Magnuson-Moss Act by focusing on that subject matter. It instead
had to inject into the analytical process a "policy" interest that was
explicitly deemed to be influential to that analysis. The court wrote:
"Therefore, given the absence of any meaningful legislative history
barring binding arbitration, coupled with the unquestionablefederal
policy favoring arbitration, we conclude that Congress did not
history to bar binding
express a clear intent in the [Act's] legislative
' 53
warranties."'
written
in
agreements
arbitration

15'Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987)
(describing the inquiry to resolve a purported conflict between the Federal

Arbitration Act and another statute; upholding binding arbitration agreements in the
context of claims brought under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). Decisions
after McMahon have always found that Congress's statutes do not bar binding
arbitration clauses. See supra note 13.
152 Walton, 293 F.3d at 474. See also the Harvard Law Review Note, supra
note 149, at 1208, where the author asserted that "it is highly improbable that the
Supreme Court would uphold the FTC's interpretation, given its rejection of similar
attempts by lower courts and even by Congress itself."
"' Davis, 305 F.3d at 1276 (emphasis added). See also Southern Energy
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This form of "statutory interpretation" that treats the
analytical process as one influenced (and perhaps determined) by
what the Alabama Supreme Court called a need for "pro-arbitration
interpretation,"' 54 is troubling. Exactly how this is supposed to work
in practice is unclear. Supreme Court cases such as McMahon state
that the "burden is on the party opposing arbitration" to demonstrate
that a subsequent act of Congress has overridden the FAA's
pronouncement that arbitration agreements "shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable." 155 The opponent of arbitration must
demonstrate that the statute's text, legislative history and purposes
show "Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies
for the statutory rights at issue.' ' 156 The test, as it was formulated in
McMahon, says nothing about the burden including the duty to
overcome also a "pro-arbitration policy." Inserting such an added
burden raises the question of whether analysis of text, history and
purposes must go beyond merely demonstrating that Congress
intended to preclude a waiver of the ability to enforce statutory rights
in court. It also raises the question of whether the McMahon test is
illusory, and instead masks a judicial preference for arbitration that
Homes, Inc. v. Lee, 732 So. 2d 994, 1009 (Ala. 1999) (See, J., dissenting)
(referring to the "Supreme Court's pro-arbitration interpretation" of the legislative
history of the Securities Exchange Act in McMahon, and aping this purported
approach). The construction of the Magnuson-Moss Act set forth in the dissenting
opinion of Justice See was adopted by the Alabama Supreme Court the following
year in Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Ard, 772 So. 2d 1131, 1135 (Ala. 2000),
following a change of the court's members occasioned by a judicial election. See
generally Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study
of Arbitration Law in Alabama, 15 J.L. & POL. 645, 660 (1999) (commentary on
the judicial election process in Alabama as it pertains to arbitration); Stephen J.
Ware, Arbitration: A License to Steal, 12 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 316,
318 (2001). See also 73 AM. JUR. 2D, Statutes § 143, at 350 (1974) ("A statutory
construction, once made and followed, should never be altered upon the changed
view of new personnel of the court."). It appears that on the same day the Lee case
was decided another case called Southern Energy Homes v. Davis was also decided.
As in Lee, the Alabama Supreme Court, in Davis, held binding arbitration clauses
to be illegal in the Magnuson-Moss context. Later, however, a motion for
reconsideration was filed and heard by the newly constituted Alabama Supreme
Court, which withdrew the earlier court's decision and replaced it with one
following the dissenting opinion in Lee that became the majority opinion in Ard.
See Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Davis, 776 So. 2d 770, 771 (Ala. 2000)
(stating that "[tihe opinion of January 8, 1999 [the date Lee was decided], is
withdrawn and the following opinion is substituted therefor").
154See Justice See's comment supra note 153.
'

McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, at 226-27.
at 227.

156Id.

The New Age of Artificial Legal Reasoning

2003]

subordinates the interest in effectuating the statutory rights of
subsequent acts of Congress.
Since there is nothing in the McMahon decision itself to
suggest that the statutory analysis is to be influenced by the insertion
of a preference for the perceived FAA pro-arbitration policy, why did
the Eleventh Circuit and the Alabama Supreme Court decide to
conduct the analytical inquiry by embracing what the latter court
called a "pro-arbitration interpretation"? The answer lies in a decision
rendered four years after McMahon, the case of Gilmer v.
Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.. 57 To understand what the Supreme
Court did in Gilmer we must first discuss "canons of contractual
construction."
Canons of contractual construction are "merely statements of
judicial preference for the resolution of a particular problem" arising
out of an agreement where what the parties intended is unclear. 158 A
familiar canon is the principle that when ambiguous a contract
"should be construed less favorably to that party that selected the
contractual language." '1 59 Canons of contractual construction are
sometimes derived from statutes. The preference of the legislative
body expressed in its enactment becomes a judicial preference for the
resolution of disputes over arguably ambiguous agreements in a
certain way. The best example of this in the field of arbitration is the
canon of construction adopted as to arbitration provisions of
collective bargaining agreements in United Steelworkers v. Warrior

157 Gilmer

v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (holding

claims under Age Discrimination in Employment Act subject to binding
arbitration).
158

6A RICHARD R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 899[3], at 81A-

108 (Patrick J. Rohan ed. 1992).

[Often, the canons are based] on common human experience and are
designed to achieve what the court believes to be the 'normal' result for
the problem under consideration. Thus, their purpose is not to ascertain
the intent of the parties to the transaction. Rather, it is to resolve a
dispute when it is otherwise impossible to ascertain the parties' intent.
Id. See also Bruce M. Kramer, The Sisyphean Task of InterpretingMineral Deeds
and Leases: An Encylcopedia of Canons of Construction, 24 TEXAS TECH. L. REV.
1, 4 (1993) (quoting 6A RICHARD R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
899[3], at 81A-108 (Patrick J. Rohan ed. 1992)).
"9 United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 216 (1970). This canon has often
been applied to insurance policies. See, e.g., American Surety Co. v. Pauly, 170
U.S. 133, 144 (1898).
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& Gulf Nay. Co.."' There the court stated that arbitration should not
be denied "unless it may be said with positive assurance that the
arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers
the asserted dispute," and cautioned that "[i]n the absence of any
express provision excluding a particular grievance from
arbitration... only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to
exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail. .. 6.
Something directly analogous to what the Court was doing in
the Steelworkers case can be found in the FAA case law. In Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,1 62 one of
the issues was whether certain disputes between a hospital and a
construction company were arbitrable under the specific contract at
hand. A problem of contractual construction was confronted. The
court stated that "questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a
healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration"1 63 and
added that "the policy of the Arbitration Act requires a liberal reading
of arbitration agreements ' 64 such that these contracts should be
construed to mandate arbitration of even defenses to arbitrability like
waiver and delay.' 65 The court cited a series of lower federal court
decisions that applied the pro-arbitration policy of the FAA to
construe broadly the scope of parties' contractual commitment to
166
arbitrate.
As a matter of public policy, adopting a canon of statutory

160

363 U.S. 574, 582-85 (1960).

161

Id. at 584. In reference to this Steelworkers case, Professor Harry H.

Wellington correctly stated that the court engaged in an act of "erect[ing] a canon
of construction that strongly favors arbitration" and that rests "upon public policy."
See Harry H. Wellington, JudicialReview of The Promise to Arbitrate, 37 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 471, 476 (1962).
162460 U.S. 1 (1983).
163 Id.

at 24.

'64

Id. at 22 n.27.

165

Id. at 24.

See, e.g., Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 643 (7th Cir.
1981) (invoking "the established federal policy that, when construing arbitration
agreements, every doubt is to be resolved in favor of arbitration"); Wick v. Atlantic
Marine, Inc., 605 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1979) (stating that "unless it can be said
with positive assurance that an arbitration clause is not susceptible of an
interpretation which would cover the dispute at issue, then a stay pending
arbitration should be granted"); see also Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at
25 n.31 (citing Dickinson, 661 F.2d 643; Wick, 605 F.2d 168).
166
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construction on the basis of a purported policy found in one act of
Congress and applying it to every other statute that the Congress
enacts presents a different activity from that seen in the Steelworkers
case and that referenced in the Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital
case. It is also not comparable to trying to harmonize two potentially
conflicting statutes. Instead, it is an act of giving preference to one
statute, and regarding all others as being of diminished authority in
the event of conflict (or alleged conflict). Yet, the Supreme Court has
often observed that "courts are not at liberty to pick and choose
among congressional enactments."' 67 The preferential "canon" is at
odds with the fundamental canons of statutory construction, which
mandate discerning Congress's intent in a particular act without
preconceptions that would obscure a fair inquiry into the meaning of
the statute, or subvert its judicial enforcement. If this were not the
case, then in that vast realm where tension (or asserted tension) exists
between statutes, courts could arrogate to themselves the legislative
function of choosing from among the conflicting statutes those they
would like to enforce and those they would decline to enforce.
Unfortunate language in a U.S. Supreme Court case decided
subsequent to Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, has contributed to
this problem. In Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., 168 the court
wrote that "[t]hroughout such an inquiry [referring to the inquiry into
the subsequent statute's text, history and purposes], it should be kept
in mind that 'questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a
healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration."' The
Gilmer court was quoting the Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital
case, but the phrase "questions of arbitrability.

.

." in Moses referred

to the issue of whether certain disputes between the hospital and the
construction company were arbitrable under the specific arbitration
contract of the parties. It was a reference to a question of contractual
and not statutory interpretation. It was a contractual interpretation
resting on "a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability,l' 69 a
law that gives us a canon of contractual construction that is based on
a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration."' 17 But, our Nation's
highest Court, this author respectfully maintains, erred in lifting the
concept discussed in the Moses case and inserting it into a very
different subject matter - the issue of statutory interpretation - in the
167 Morton

v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974).

168 Gilmer

v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).

169

Moses H. Cone Mem 'lHosp., 460 U.S. at 24.

170

Id.
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Gilmer case. The United States Supreme Court7 1must correct its error

in Gilmer, and what has in part flowed from it.'
The error results in advocates arguing to a court by pointing
to cases like McMahon and Gilmer and saying, "[i]ook at the result
that was reached, it is a result favoring arbitration. This is the result
you must reach." Though those cases involved statutes that were
entirely different from the Magnuson-Moss Act, and, more
importantly, though in those cases the United States Supreme Court
mandated the employment of an analytical process, one that entails
an examination of the statute's text, its history and its purposes, a
court is told that there is really only one result permissible. The idea
is advanced that the Supreme Court really did not mean what it said
about conducting a statutory interpretation analysis.
This is the most deeply flawed argument that an advocate can
make to a court. When our Nation's courts interpret statutes, they aim
to do so in a careful, lawyerly, and disciplined way, to achieve one
purpose and one purpose only. And, that is not to reach a result that
the court likes, it is rather to adopt a construction of the statute that is
faithful to the intent of the legislative body.172

171

Of course, the Supreme Court often employs canons of statutory

construction, but it has consistently refused to apply such canons "when application
would be tantamount to a formalistic disregard of congressional intent." Rice v.
Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 732 (1983). See also DeCoteau v. District County Court,
420 U.S. 425, 447 (1975) ("A canon of construction is not a license to disregard
clear expressions of ... congressional intent.").

is beyond the scope of this article to fully discuss Justice Scalia's
criticism of the use of legislative history. See, e.g., United States v.
Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 521 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment) (upbraiding the majority for "resort[ing] to that last hope of lost
interpretive causes, that St. Jude of the hagiology of statutory construction,
legislative history"); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1986) (Scalia, J.,
172 It

concurring in judgment); see William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37
UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); William D. Popkin, An "Internal" Critique of Justice
Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1133 (1992);
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism:An Invitation to
Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749
(1995); Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court's Declining Reliance on Legislative
History: The Impact of Justice Scalia's Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369

(1999). One must note, however, that the case law called into question here is an
excellent example of how legislative history analysis can go awry. A lawyer several
years ago went through the thousands of pages of legislative history of the
Magnuson-Moss Act and located the single ambiguous sentence from the 1970
Senate Report discussed above. This then became the focus of the analysis of
legislative history in a series of cases. It helped to change the law in this field, and
to facilitate the judicial repudiation of an administrative agency's interpretation of a
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VI. The Statutory Text
In examining the text of a statute one should consider the
language as a whole. 173 It is also proper to keep in mind the
objectives of the statute. 174 Coexisting with the above principles,
statutory language is to be given its plain meaning where this is
readily discernible. Whether
one is an "interpretivist,"
"intentionalist" or "textualist" in one's philosophy of statutory
construction, the175
aim of all judges is to effectuate the intent of the
body.
legislative
statute that it had adhered to for twenty-five years. It provided assistance in
imposing a judicial construction on a statute that is very much at odds with the
statute's text and the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body. But, the fact
that legislative history has been used improperly is not an adequate reason that it
should always be disregarded. The reality is that context does matter, and that an
assessment of how a piece of legislation came about, what the concerns were that
motivated the legislative body to act, and what choices were made and how they
were made, facilitates an effective and faithful reading of the text. If the
examination of legislative history is conducted properly, as an aid to one's careful
consideration of the statutory text, then it is a useful and legitimate undertaking,
one fully consistent with the textualist commitment to effectuating the expressed
intent of the institution that is vested with policy-making power. It is an approach
that adheres to the mandate that judges not make "themselves into what is really a
legislative body with a veto." GUNTHER, supra note 8, at 51 (quoting Judge
Learned Hand).
173See Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993) (it is a "fundamental
principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning
of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in
which it is used").
174 See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust and Sav. Bank, 510
U.S. 86, 94-95 (1993) (a court's examination of statutory language is "guided not
by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look[s] to the provisions of the
whole law, and to its object and policy") (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987)); see also Szajna v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 115 Ill. 2d 294, 315, 503 N.E.2d 760, 769 (Ill. 1987) (courts
applying the Magnuson-Moss Act must endeavor to "accomplish the purpose of
Magnuson-Moss of furnishing broad warranty protection to the consumer").
175See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation,
12 HARV. L. REv. 417 (1899). Justice Holmes' article includes this statement: "We
do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means." Id.
at 419. This comment has sometimes been cited to claim investigative forays into
legislative intent that are not confined solely to the text are suspect. However,
Holmes was writing about the "general theory of construction" for written
instruments, and explained that "[w]e ask, not what this man meant, but what those
words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English, using them in the
circumstances in which they were used, and it is to this end of answering the last
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A. The Courts' Failure to Give the Statute's Provisions as to
Informal Dispute Settlement Procedures Any Meaning While
Treating Much of the Statutory Language as Incomplete or
Unnecessary
Walton, Davis, American Home of Lancaster, and Ard,176
leave something out when they conduct the analysis of statutory text.
While asserting in a way that is conclusory that there is nothing in the
statute that deals with binding arbitration, they omit to explain what
the statute does mean. They are satisfied with saying only what it
does not mean. Analysis that gainsays an offered construction, but
that leaves the subject alone after doing so, is unsatisfactory.
Congress writes the provisions for its statutes with a purpose.
What then could "informal dispute settlement procedure,"
"mechanism" or "proceeding" possibly mean if the construction
being advanced here is incorrect. If "informal dispute settlement
mechanism" is not a generic phrase encompassing all redress
mechanisms other than the formal adjudicative processes of our
courts of law, then what is it?
One possibility is that Congress meant to convey a transaction
of an "informal" nature that would take place between the consumer
and the manufacturer (or supplier) that issued the warranty. The
transaction would be in the nature of an initiative by the consumer to
secure warranty compliance and the warrantor's response thereto.
Such a bilateral transaction can obviously have "procedural" steps, in
that a warrantor may have created a process whereby the consumer's
complaint as to warranty breach could be channeled to it for
responsive action. Such a consumer-warrantor interchange could be
quite simple; it could consist of nothing more than the transmittal of a
letter or the placing of a telephone call that alerts the warrantor to the
nature of the grievance and the consumer's desired response to the
problem.
But, in advancing this theory of the meaning of the statute's
numerous provisions as to "informal dispute settlement procedures,"
there is a problem. Congress described just such a bilateral
transaction in its statute, and distinguished it from an "informal
dispute settlement procedure." In specifying the various aspects of a
question that we let in evidence as to what the circumstances were." Id. at 417-18
(emphasis added). Holmes also observed that courts "do not deal differently" with

text from a statute "from our way of dealing with a contract." Id. at 419. The
circumstances matter as one assesses "what those words would mean" in the
context of a statute. See generally Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Ex. 1584).
176

See cases cited supra note 10.
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warranty, the full and conspicuous disclosure of which could be

mandated pursuant to the rules to be created by the FTC, Congress
listed the following item in subsection (7) of 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a):
The step-by-step procedure which the consumer should
take in order to obtain performance of any obligation under
the warranty, including the identification of any person or
class of persons authorized to perform the obligations set
forth in the warranty.
In the next subsection, 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(8), Congress then
separately listed a different item disclosure of which could be
mandated:
Information respecting the availability of any informal
dispute settlement procedure offered by the warrantor and a
recital, where the warranty so provides, that the purchaser
may be required to resort to such procedure before pursuing
any legal remedies in the courts.
If "informal dispute settlement procedure" was the same thing
as a "procedure" whereby a consumer would attempt to secure
warranty compliance through a bilateral transaction with the
warrantor, Congress would not have described it in a separate section,
and clearly treated it as something distinct. The only conclusion is
that the "informal dispute settlement procedure" involved something
more than a consumer-warrantor transaction where the two parties
interact with the aim of settling their dispute.
What could that something more be? Another provision in the
statute, found at 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3), makes the answer clear.
There, Congress stated that in the event of a lawsuit, "any decision in
such [informal dispute settlement] procedure shall be admissible in
evidence." Congress evinced an intent that the procedure would
sometimes involve a "decision" by a third party. This suffices to
show that Congress was describing "arbitration" as at least one 177 of
the forms of informal dispute settlement procedure that would be
used. As was stated a century ago, "[m]ediation recommends.
Arbitration decides."'' 78 Essential to the very nature of arbitration is
the idea of a "decision" by a third party. As Judge Weinstein once
Note that Congress did not say "the decision" but instead said "any
decision" and thus implied that a "decision" might or might not be the outcome of
177

the informal dispute settlement procedure.
178 7 MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW 25 (1906).
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wrote: "If the parties have agreed to submit a dispute
for a decision
17
by a third party, they have agreed to arbitration."
One possible counter-argument is that the concept of
"decision" is not confined to a determination by a third party. For
example, when a warrantor chooses not to repair a defective product
that it has sold to a consumer, having been requested to take remedial
action to cure the defect and thus to bring the product into
compliance with the warranty, then it has made a "decision." But it
makes no sense to construe the language from 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3)
to refer to that unilateral decision of the warrantor because Congress
would not have said that such a decision would be "admissible in
evidence." That type of "decision" inheres in the very nature of a
cognizable claim for breach of warranty. It always must be
admissible in evidence.
It is fair to observe generally that given the way consumer
product warranties are written in our society, no consumer can ever
recover on a breach of warranty claim without, as a threshold matter,
proving that he alerted the warrantor that there was a problem with
the product.
There are essentially two types of consumer product
warranties: "full" warranties, as defined by the Act at 15 U.S.C.
§ 2303(a)(1), and "limited" warranties, which are recognized in the
Act, and which are drafted pursuant to Uniform Commercial Code
§ 2-719(1)."' As for the latter, which are the most common types of

"9 AMF v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F. Supp. 456, 460 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). See

also Goldman, supra note 72, at 197 ("Most generally, arbitration involves the
voluntary submission of a dispute for final determination by someone other than a

judge after an informal presentation of evidence and argument."); Jones, supra note
71, at 243 ("Arbitration is the submission of some disputed matter to selected

persons and the substitution of their decision or award for the judgment of the
established tribunals of justice.") (quoting Castle-Curtis Arbitration, 30 Atl. 769
(1894)); Leon A. Kovin, UninsuredMotorist Arbitration Under the Illinois Statute,
21 ARB. J.229 (1966) (describing arbitration as a "voluntary proceeding whereby
the parties by agreement submit their controversy to either an impartial panel of
arbitrators, or one neutral person, who upon hearing of evidence and argument
render a decision"). One author has explained that the root of the word "arbiter" is
found in the Oscan Umbrian word "arputrati," which can be translated as "one who
goes to something in order to see or hear it." John J. Savage, On the Meaning of the
Term "Arbitration",7 ARB. J. 99 (1952). The word arbitration includes at its core
the concept of a third party decisionmaker.
180 For example, a provision of the Illinois U.C.C., 810 ILL. COMP. STAT.
§ 5/2-719(1)(a) (2002), permits the seller to craft an agreement "limiting the
buyer's remedies to return of the goods and repayment of the price or to repair and
replacement of non-conforming goods or parts." In the Magnuson-Moss Act,
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warranties, known as "standard materials and workmanship
warranties" or "limited repair or replace warranties," 18 1 the consumer
cannot keep secret the fact that the product is malfunctioning and
then suddenly commence a lawsuit.
The consumer must give the warrantor notice of the defect,
and an opportunity to repair or replace. The chief avenue for securing
damages for breach of an express materials and workmanship
warranty is proving within the meaning of UCC § 2-719(2) that the
limited remedy "failed of its essential purpose," in the sense that the
warrantor was given the opportunity to effect repairs (and to thus
render the product non-defective and in compliance with the
s2
warranty) but failed to do so within a reasonable period of time.'
"limited warranty" is defined simply for what it is not, a warranty that fails to meet
the federal minimum standards set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 2304 which must be
satisfied before a warranty can be denominated "full." Parenthetically, where the
Magnuson-Moss Act does not speak to a particular aspect of warranty law, then
one looks to state law, and typically the UCC, for the legal principles to be applied.
See, e.g., Sorce v. Naperville Jeep Eagle, Inc., 309 Il.App. 3d 313, 322-23, 722
N.E.2d 227, 234 (111. App. Ct. 1999) ("In analyzing Magnuson-Moss issues, it must
be kept in mind that in the first instance the UCC governs sale of goods, including
accompanying warranties."); Lara v. Hyundai Motor Am., 331 Iln. App. 3d 53, 61,
770 N.E.2d 721, 728 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (noting that where there is no pertinent
provision in the Act, the issues are "by implication, governed by the UCC"); Walsh
v. Ford Motor Co., 807 F.2d 1000, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("state warranty law lies
at the base of all warranty claims under Magnuson-Moss"), cert. denied, 482 U.S.
915 (1987); MacKenzie v. Chrysler Corp., 607 F.2d 1162, 1166 (5th Cir. 1979).
18' See generally John S. Herbrand, Annotation, Construction and Effect of
New Motor Vehicle Warranty Limiting Manufacturer's Liability to Repair or
Replacement of Defective Parts, 2 A.L.R. 4TH 576 (1980); John Alan Goren,
Buyer's Right to Revoke Acceptance Against the Automobile Manufacturer for
Breach of Its Continuing Warranty of Repair or Replacement, 7 GA. L. REV. 711
(1973).
182 The Official Comment to Illinois U.C.C. § 2-719 states: "[I]t is of the very
essence of a sales contract that at least minimum adequate remedies be
available. ... [U]nder subsection (2), where an apparently fair and reasonable
clause because of circumstances fails in its essential purpose or operates to deprive
either party of the substantial value of the bargain, it must give way to the general
remedy provisions of this Article." 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-719, Uniform
Commercial Code Comment 1, at 488 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (emphasis added); see
also Intrastate Piping & Controls, Inc. v. Robert-James Sales, Inc., 315 Ill. App. 3d
248, 257, 733 N.E.2d 718, 725 (111. App. Ct. 2000); Lara v. Hyundai Motor Am.,
331 I1. App. 3d 53, 62, 770 N.E.2d 721, 728-29 (I1. App. Ct. 2002) (a limited
automobile "repair or replace" warranty "fails of its essential purpose when a seller
...is unsuccessful in correcting the defects within a reasonable time" and when
this occurs, the warranty's limitations and exclusions will have "no effect" and
"damages will be available to plaintiff pursuant to the [U.C.C.]"); Dynaic

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 15: 3

Thus, at the essence of the prima facie case is proof that the
consumer sought from the warrantor action that was not forthcoming.
There is normally proof in a case alleging breach of warranty
of an interaction between the consumer and the warrantor whereby
the latter might be said to "decide" whether it shall elect to comply
with the warranty. Interpreting the language "any decision in such
procedure shall be admissible in evidence" as referring to a
"decision" of this type means adopting a construction that says where
breach of a limited warranty is at issue, the conduct of the warrantor
that is alleged to constitute the breach "shall be admissible.' 83 In
other words, in treating "decision" as a warrantor's unilateral act of
responding to a request for compliance, Congress added nothing
to
1 84
tried.
is
case
warranty
limited
of
breach
a
how
of
reality
the
Recycling Servs., Inc. v. Shred Pax Corp., 210 111. App. 3d 602, 614, 569 N.E.2d
570, 577 (I11.
App. Ct. 1991) ("Dynamic was entitled to expect Shred Pax [the
warrantor] to repair or replace within a reasonable amount of time after Shred Pax
became aware that the shredder did not conform to the contract."); Custom
Automated Mach. v. Penda Corp., 537 F. Supp. 77, 83 (N.D. I11.
1982) (remedy
limitation failed of its essential purpose when the seller "did not correct the defects
[within its product] within a reasonable time. Therefore, the limitation of remedy
clause fails of its essential purpose and full UCC remedies are available to
[plaintiff]").
183 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3) (2000). The same is true of "full" warranties. To
demonstrate a breach of 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(4), which requires the warrantor to
"permit the consumer to elect" either refund or replacement of the product in the
event it fails to remedy the defects within "a reasonable number of attempts," the
consumer must again introduce into evidence the transaction with the warrantor
taking place after a defect has manifested itself. It adds nothing for Congress to
state that the warrantor's responsive action (its "decision") may be admissible in
evidence. There is no way such subject matter could not be admissible if the
consumer is to be allowed to try her case. "Full" warranties are rarely issued by
American manufacturers. See Joan Vogel, Squeezing Consumers: Lemon Laws,
Consumer Warranties, and a Proposalfor Reform, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 589, 613
(1985) ("In the case of automobiles, the warranties did not change dramatically
after passage of the Act. Only American Motors currently provides a full warranty
to car purchasers."). This is an example of how Congress's aspirations for how
manufacturers would conduct themselves after passage of the Act were not
realized. The failure of the vast majority of companies to create informal dispute
settlement procedures that comply with the Act and the Federal Trade
Commission's regulations is another example.
184 A trial lawyer, after reading the foregoing discussion, would quickly
recognize the implications of the provision in 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3). He would
view this provision allowing for the introduction into evidence of the mechanism's
decision as being potentially extraordinarily prejudicial. In the event the consumer
lost his cause before the dispute settlement mechanism, no attorney representing a
manufacturer would omit to begin his opening statement to the jury in the
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The position that "decision" equals nothing more than the
warrantor's response to a complaint has another overarching flaw.
Such a line of analysis, which treats informal dispute settlement
procedures solely as the arena for the warrantor's unilateral response
to a complaint of warranty noncompliance, cannot be squared with
the legislative inclusion of words like "proceeding" to describe the
informal resolution mechanism.85 For example, when one returns an
automobile to the manufacturer's designated dealership because its
transmission proves defective, and forces a "decision" on whether or
not the warranty grievance shall be resolved, one does not think of
the transaction that follows as a "proceeding."' 186 Nor does one who
subsequent court trial with these words: "The plaintiff here already had his claim
heard at an arbitration proceeding, one whose operation is supervised by an agency
called the Federal Trade Commission. The evidence in this case will show that the
arbitrator determined the plaintiff's claim had no merit." The defendant's counsel
might pause, allow his words to resonate for a bit, and then resume his seat. He
would surely begin his cross-examination of the plaintiff by bringing up the
adverse decision, and he would no doubt publish the dispute settlement
mechanism's decision in his case in chief. In other contexts, evidence of such a
type would be excluded by most trial judges who would be concerned as to how the
probative value would ever justify the introduction into evidence of facts of such a
highly prejudicial character. This was the whole point of the provision. Congress
really did intend to encourage the resolution of most consumer claims through the
speedy, inexpensive and fair alternative mechanism they were directing warrantors
to create. They inserted this provision to make sure the alternative dispute
resolution mechanism would be viewed as a means to secure resolution of claims,
rather than as merely a procedural hurdle on the way to court. Some state court
systems, like that of Illinois, use various rules aimed at ensuring good faith
participation in judicial arbitration mechanisms. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 91(b) (rule
providing that where a party fails "to participate in the arbitration hearing in good
faith and in a meaningful manner" an "order debarring that party from rejecting the
award" may be entered by the court). Were the Illinois Supreme Court to fashion a
rule like the one Congress created in 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3), constitutional
concerns would fairly be raised. But, this is not true of Congress's statute.
Remember that Congress was creating a statutory right of action, and thus it was
within its powers when it circumscribed how its right of action could proceed in a
court of law. This is also one of the grand ironies of the Magnuson-Moss/FAA
issue. Congress carefully balanced the interests of manufacturers and consumers in
this statue. It created a means by which most consumer claims would, as a practical
matter, never go to court. All that the warrantors have to do is comply with the
statue and its implementing regulations, and they would likely find that the
purported objectives underlying their litigation assaults on this statute would in the
main be better served by acting within the law, instead of in defiance of it.
185 See 15 U.S.C. § 2304(b)(1) (using the language "informal dispute
settlement proceeding").
186 See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S

COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY

929 (10th ed. 1995)

(listing as first definition of proceeding "legal action"). When an ordinary person
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telephones a warrantor's "consumer hotline" think of the interaction
that takes place as a "proceeding." Congress's use of the word
"proceeding" to describe these informal dispute resolution processes
should make clear to anyone that Congress was speaking of a dispute
resolution process, i.e., something in the nature of an arbitration. This
at its core is nothing other than a structured mechanism featuring
presentations by both the consumer and the warrantor before a third
party who is tasked with deciding the dispute.
Analysis of the plain meaning of the text of the statute thus
leads to the conclusion that Congress intended to legislate regarding
dispute resolution mechanisms involving third party decisionmakers
who would resolve the controversy between buyer and seller.
Congress intended its 87
Act and the federal regulations to apply to
procedures.'
arbitration
hears the word "proceeding," she is indeed likely to think of something like a legal
proceeding. This is certainly the way lawyers use it. It is the way members of our
legislative bodies use it. The public knows this and they have come to use it that
way too. Some dictionaries, in defining "proceeding," list "legal action" or
"litigation" after they list more generalized formulations of the meaning of the
word "proceeding." See RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1075
(Newly rev. and updated ed. 1995) (initially defining it as "a particular action, or
course or manner of action"). It is a commonplace in lexicography to place first
emphasis on defining words with elastic and broad phrases so that the dictionary
covers all of the word's possible uses. Typically the broad formulations of the
concept represented by a word are listed first, and then a specific and highly
contextual meaning is given, as is the case with the second-cited dictionary
treatment of the word "proceeding." When a court looks to a dictionary, it must
remain mindful that it is seeking to import a descriptive account taken from a
unique context - one marked by the lexicographer's duty to encompass, which
frequently involves, at least initially, a process of diminishing specific contextual
meaning.
187 This conclusion about the plain meaning of informal dispute settlement
procedures should not be so hard to accept especially in light of the fact that
numerous state legislatures have crafted statutes that define informal dispute
settlement mechanisms as a synonym for arbitration procedures. See, for instance,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 681.102(17) (West 2000) ("'Procedure' means an informal
dispute-settlement procedure established by a manufacturer to mediate and
arbitrate motor vehicle warranty disputes"); N.J. REV. STAT. § 56-12-30 (2000)
("'Manufacturer's informal dispute settlement procedure' means an arbitration
process or procedure by which the manufacturer attempts to resolve disputes .... );
IDAHO CODE § 48-906 (Michie 2000) ("An informal dispute settlement mechanism
provided by this chapter shall, at the time a request for arbitrationis made, provide
to the consumer and to each person who will arbitrate the consumer's dispute,
information.... ."); ME. REV. STAT. ANN tit. 10, § 1161(5) (West 2000) ("Statecertified arbitrationmeans the informal dispute settlement procedure administered
by the Department of the Attorney General which arbitrates consumer
complaints.... ."); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 357-D:4 (2000) ("Arbitration of the
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The analysis should not end there, however. There are a
number of other provisions pertaining to informal dispute settlement
mechanisms that must be examined. Each sheds light on Congress's
intent. One appears at § 2304(b)(1), where Congress guarded against
certain warrantors (those issuing "full" warranties, within the
meaning of §§ 2303(a)(1) and 2304) imposing "any duty other than
notification" on consumers "as a condition of securing [a] remedy"
when a consumer product malfunctions, by requiring that warrantors
prove "such a duty is reasonable." 18 8 Congress said no such duty
could be imposed unless "the warrantor has demonstrated in a
rulemaking proceeding, or can demonstrate in an administrative or
judicial enforcement proceeding (including private enforcement), or
in an informal dispute settlement proceeding, that such duty is
reasonable."' 89 By this provision, it is reasonable to conclude that
Congress understood (leaving aside FTC administrative proceedings)
that there would only be two fora where warranty disputes would be
decided - courts of law and "informal dispute settlement
proceedings."
An opposing argument might posit that arbitration is a
"substitute for litigation in the courts. ' 9° Therefore when judicial
enforcement proceedings were referenced in § 2304(b)(1), it was
understood that arbitration proceedings would be encompassed in
such reference.
However, the idea that arbitration is a substitute for formal
litigation raises a question that cannot be answered satisfactorily or
consistent with construing the statute's language as being irrelevant
to arbitration. To state that arbitration is a "substitute" says nothing
more than that the same claim that might be resolved in a formal
adjudicative process will be decided in an alternative procedure
substituted for the court process. This carries with it the notion that
the same claim will be decided pursuant to the same legal principles
that would be applied in a formal trial. By the same token, informal
dispute settlement mechanisms, within the meaning of the statute,
though they would obviously not entail the structure, formality, costs,
and time of a formal trial in a court of law, would have to, at a

consumer's complaint, either through the manufacturer's dispute settlement
mechanism or the board, shall be held within 40 days ..
all).

'88 15 U.S.C. § 2304(b)(1) (2000).
189 id.
190

Sturges, supra note 31, at 1032.

") (emphasis added to
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minimum, apply the same law to resolve claims. What would be the
point of any resolution mechanism that did not attempt to effectuate
the consumer's rights according to the law?
Thus, in the context of § 2304(b)(l) the mention of "informal
dispute settlement proceeding[s]" was no more necessary than a
reference to arbitration. Like arbitration, an informal dispute
settlement proceeding is a "substitute" for judicial claim
resolution.191 We are left with the conclusion that the reference in
2304(b)(1) was borne of the drafter's intention to delineate all of the
fora where issues about warrantor-imposed duties would be resolved.
The provision in § 2310(d), where Congress provided for
attorney's fees, also clarifies the meaning of the statute. Note that the
section says those fees are to be awarded only by "the court." This
made sense because an "informal dispute settlement procedure"
would be a process that is fair, easy to understand, and easy to use,
and would not require substantial, if any, attorney's fees.' 92 Further,
these procedures would be subject to FTC oversight. 193 Consumers
could then in most instances use them without the need to hire an
attorney. But if, as some courts have asserted, arbitration is such a
"formal" thing, so very different from the procedures Congress had in
mind and so very similar to judicial processes, Congress would have
said in L42310(d) "the court or an arbitrator,"instead of merely "the
court."
Ultimately, the statutory interpretation analysis requires an
effort to grasp the overall intent of Congress as to informal dispute
'9' The

argument that the arbitration-as-distinct-settlement-mechanism camp

might assert here that binding arbitration is a permanent substitution, while
informal dispute settlement proceedings is not necessarily binding, does not alter
this result. The informal dispute settlement mechanism has the same purpose - to
resolve the claim, and though it might not do so with finality, this does not alter the
fact that, despite its non-binding and hence non-final nature, it is intended to
resolve the very same legal controversy pursuant to the very same legal principles.
Again, what would be the point of actively encouraging the development of
alternative dispute settlement procedures if the legislative body was not really
trying to have them act as an effective (though not ultimately preclusive) substitute
for litigation?
192 It is important to stress that under 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a), all the terms of a
written warranty were required, subject to the discretion of the FTC, to be "fully
and conspicuously" disclosed in "simple and readily understood language" that
would not "mislead a reasonable, average consumer." See 15 U.S.C. § 2303(a),
(a)(13).
193 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(2) (2000).
194id.
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settlement procedures. When we undertake this analysis we find the
position argued for by proponents of the legality of binding
arbitration clauses makes the specific features just described, features
that are troubling since they tend to make the language used in
precise provisions of the statute seem either incomplete or
unnecessary, but a foreshadowing of a more unacceptable reality the imputation to Congress of the intent to draft a statute that is
absurd.
B. The Magnuson-Moss Act Has Been Construed to Render It
Absurd
"Informal dispute settlement procedure" is not defined in the
statute in an explicit way, but rather by (1) its breadth, (2) its
explicitly stated context, i.e., as something created by the warrantor
and inserted into its warranty, and (3) its use in the statute.
The word "any" describes the dispute settlement procedures
in the Magnuson-Moss Act, when they are first referenced. 195 "The
word 'any' has an expansive meaning, that is 'one or some
indiscriminately of whatever kind."' 196 Despite the breadth of such
phrasing, the legislature did not render this text indeterminate
because the specific context of "informal dispute settlement
procedures," "mechanisms" and "proceedings" was very clear.
Congress was dealing with a dispute settlement procedure created by
a warrantor and placed inside its warranty.1 97 Congress dealt with
these procedures by carefully regulating them in a variety of ways.
The use of the phrase was at all times part of a process to protect the
interests of consumers in these privately created dispute resolution
mechanisms.
It is impossible from a reading of the statute's text for a court
not to conclude that Congress delineated the specific operational
characteristics of some species of private dispute resolution
procedures ("informal dispute settlement procedures") incorporated
in written warranties. As to these procedures, Congress mandated:

195

See Id. § 2302(a)(8) ("any informal dispute settlement procedure")

(emphasis added).
196 United
197

States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997).

The full text of the statute makes it plain that this is what Congress meant.

See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(8) (procedures "offered by the warrantor" and placed

in the "warranty"); Id. § 2310(a)(2) (procedure "incorporated into the terms of a
written warranty to which any provision of this chapter applies").
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* how they would be created (by the manufacturer), 19 8
" how they would be disclosed to consumers ("fully and
conspicuously" in "readily understood language" that
would not "mislead a reasonable, average consumer"), 199
* who would participate in200such procedures ("independent
or governmental entities"),
* who would supervise them ("[lt]he Commission")

20 '

" how that agency would supervise
them (by "setting forth
20 2
minimum requirements"),
* how the courts would supervise them before FTC

regulations were promulgated
(by determining that such
3
procedure is not "unfair"), 0
* how duties imposed on consumers by warrantors would

be deemed enforceable in them (by showing "any duty
other than notification" is "reasonable"), 204
* who would participate in them in the context of
25
aggregative litigation (only the "named plaintiffs ),
0 and
* how the mechanism's decision would be used on
conclusion of the procedure ("shall be admissible in

'9'15 U.S.C. §§ 2302(a)(8), 2310(a)(I)-(2) (2000).
'99 Id. §§ 2302(a), 2302(a)(13).

200 Id. § 2310(a)(2).
211 Id. § 2310(a)(2), (3)-(4).
202

Id. § 23 10(a)(2), (3)-(4).

203 15 U.S.C. § 23 10(a)(5) (2000).
204

Id.§ 2304(b)(1).

205 Id. § 23

10(a)(3).
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evidence" in court action).2 °6
Congress delineated every aspect of the process of these
private "dispute settlement mechanisms" placed in warranties.
According to the construction of the statute by the Southern courts,
Congress simultaneously allowed that any and all of the
aforementioned provisions could be ignored whenever a
manufacturer or retailer simply elects to denominate the dispute
settlement procedure in its warranty an "arbitration."
Purportedly, Congress's statute mandated that certain
warrantor-created dispute resolution mechanisms would at all times
be under the vigilant supervision of the FTC that would "review the
bona fide operation of any dispute settlement procedure," and that
would promulgate rules "setting forth minimum requirements for
any" such procedure to ensure fairness in every single step of the
process. But, Congress also wrote its law so that it would completely
liberate manufacturers and retailers from any FTC oversight and any
FTC rules if they simply denominated their privately created
procedures "arbitration" procedures. 207 Thus, warrantors are free to
charge a high fee to use the procedure, they are at liberty to select an
inconvenient situs for the arbitration, and they are free to structure the
mechanism's operation so as to elevate the potential for it to be
biased in their favor. Most importantly, warrantors are provided with
206

Id. § 2310(a)(3).

207

15 U.S.C. §§ 2310(a)(2), (4). These concerns about the procedural and

substantive fairness of every step of the process, expressed in the Act, go well
beyond the very limited judicial monitoring of the outcomes of statutory arbitration
procedures. Under the FAA, like state arbitration statutes, there is permissible court
intervention only in extreme cases of unfairness or misconduct. See 9 U.S.C. § 10
(providing relief for awards procured by corruption, fraud or undue means).
Arbitration procedures can be unfair in more subtle ways. See Shelly Smith,
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts: Consumer Protection and
the Circumvention of the Judicial System, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191, 1231 (2001)

("Large corporations give arbitration organizations a lot of business which may
implicitly pressure arbitrators to rule on the side of large corporations, due to the
ever present threat that unsatisfied corporations could take their business to another
arbitrator."); Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and
FinancialInstitutions:A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON
DisP. RESOL. 267, 283-84 (1995); Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive
Contracts,and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration
Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223, 235-39 (1998); Sarah Rudolph Cole,
Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against the Enforcement of Executory
Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV.
449, 474-79 (1996); Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S.TEX. L.
REV. 485, 521-29 (1997).
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the right to make the mechanism, however unfair its procedural
aspects might be, binding so as to foreclose any other avenue of relief
to the consumer. This interpretation renders the Magnuson-Moss Act
absurd. 208 If Congress was so keenly interested in making the non-

binding alternative dispute resolution procedures it was legislating
entirely fair, then surely it must have had at least as great a concern in
ensuring that every step of a binding alternative dispute resolution
mechanism was also fair.
C. Why Has the Statutory Text Been in Large Measure Ignored
in the Case Law and Scholarly Commentary?
There is no detailed textual analysis of the type just supplied
in any of the reported cases. 209 In those cases enforcing the statute in
accordance with the FTC's interpretation, perhaps it is
understandable that the statutory language was not analyzed that
closely. The courts were sure of themselves in applying the
administrative agency's interpretation, something that our courts

One scholar has described the principle that statutes should be construed to
avoid absurdity as "the Golden Rule." T. I. MCLEOD, PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
1-14 to 1-17 (1984); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting
Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 466 n.222 (1989) (citing
McLeod). Judge Learned Hand was a prime expositor of this view. See, e.g.,
Borella v. Borden Co., 145 F.2d 63, 65 (2d Cir. 1994), aff'd, 325 U.S. 679 (1945)
("We can conjure up no reason that could have induced Congress, having included
employees who made tenantable the quarters of artisans and shipping clerks, to
exclude those who made tenantable the quarters of the president, the managers, the
cashiers, superintendents and the rest."). The U.S. Supreme Court also cautions
against constructions that would render the legislative body's act an absurdity. See
Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 507-11 (1989) (refusing to adopt
a statutory construction that "makes no sense whatsoever"; quoting dissenting
lower court judge); Pub. Citizen v. United States, 491 U.S. 440, 467 (1989) (same);
Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 74 (1984). There are two forms of the
"absurdity" limitation. There is the one used by Learned Hand where the judge
attempts to avoid in every stage of analysis doing something that would make the
legislative body's enactment look rather stupid. Then there is the one that has
sometimes been used of late as a final stage of analysis. This latter use of the
"absurdity" limitation, often associated with initially focusing exclusively upon a
simple dictionary definition of key statutory language, is analogous to someone
trying to paint a portrait in the dark, and then upon completion snapping on the
light to see if the person's image was captured in such a deficient way that the
portrait cannot be handed over to the patron who commissioned it.
209 See case law cited supra note 10. Legal scholars and commentators
have
not scrutinized the language carefully either. See law review commentaries cited
supra notes 33 and 149.
208

2003]

The New Age of Artificial Legal Reasoning

235

generally strive to show deference towards. But, this says nothing of
the cases repudiating the FIC view. They omit to confront the
language in any meaningful way as well.
The courts have erred in following a purportedly unassailable
policy proposition, one that favors "finding" a way to construe all
subsequent statutes to enforce binding arbitration clauses, no matter
the context. This is not justified. Such a reading imputes to the U.S.
Supreme Court the attempt to convert into a needless exercise the
application of such fundamental principles as the importance of
textual analysis aimed at effectuating the intent of the legislative
body.

VII. The Statute's Purposes
A. Framing the Statutory "Purposes" Inquiry
"[C]onstruction and application are intellectually impossible
except with reference to some reason and theory of purpose." 2 1° To
determine whether there is an "inherent conflict between arbitration
and the statute's underlying purposes,,' 2 11 we have to undertake a
two-step analysis. The first step is to define clearly the Supreme
Court's test, and the latter step is to apply it.
The test must be carefully defined because as usually stated it
admits of only one answer. If arbitration is considered a relatively
low cost and efficient alternative to the expense and time of formal
legal process, then the interest in embracing it would never be in
conflict with statutory rights. Leaving aside the causes for skepticism
among the members of the plaintiff's bar, a skepticism not without a
measure of validity as to certain points, 212 and assuming that
210 Collection of Karl Llewellyn Papers, J, VII, I, e, at 5 (1944) (available in
University of Chicago Law Library); see also Chris Williams, The Statute of
Limitations, Prospective Warranties, and Problems of Interpretationin Article Two
of the UCC, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 67, 100 n.176 (1983) (quoting from the
Collection).
211 Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987).

The complaints focus on the potential for arbitrator bias, see supra note
207. There are also important concerns about the lack of certain judicial rules, like
rules permitting meaningful discovery and the evidentiary rules. See, e.g,, Paul
212

Bland, Resisting Corporate Efforts To Impose Mandatory Arbitration On
Consumers, 2 TEX. J. OF CONSUMER L. 94, 95 (1999) (stating that "[a]rbitrators
need not follow rules of evidence and may consider hearsay evidence"); Davis v.
Prudential Securities, 59 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir. 1995) (arbitrators not bound by
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arbitration were to function as a fair process involving a neutral third
party decisionmaker, then it seems generally better to allow a citizen
with a statutory claim to have that claim decided faster and cheaper in
an arbitration. In this sense, requiring that a plaintiff prove that the
purposes of a statute are in direct conflict with the FAA's mandate to
treat arbitration contracts as enforceable is asking the impossible.
To be more than an exercise in futility, the "purpose" test
must rest on a recognition that FAA arbitration has a specific
meaning. FAA arbitration is voluntary at its core. It is an undertaking
whereby parties have knowingly and willfully entered into an
agreement to have their disputes decided in an alternative forum.
When the U.S. Supreme Court states that the party opposing
arbitration has the burden of showing that Congress "intended in a
separate statute to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies, or that such
a waiver of judicial remedies inherently conflicts with the underlying
purposes of that other statute, '' 2 13 the "waiver" it is speaking of is this
truly voluntary waiver.
Furthermore, the "policy" to be tested against it, i.e., the
policy of the subsequent statute, is not merely the legislature's most
obvious policy as described by the interest in creating a statutory
right that one may predicate a suit upon, but rather it is found in the
character of the transactions between citizens which Congress has
elected to legislate. The issue is whether the voluntary relinquishment
of the right to go to court is in conflict with the legislative body's
assessment of the voluntary or involuntary character of the terms of
the transactions that are the subject of the subsequent statute. One of
judicial rules of evidence); Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and
Jurisdiction,1996 SuP. CT. REV. 331, 348 ("While discovery may be regarded as a

mixed blessing at best, because of its costs, it cannot be doubted that the
availability of discovery assures that courts in general are more effective than
arbitral tribunals in detecting wrongdoing and enforcing the rights of victims ....)
An additional concern arises from the fact that arbitrators often "favor 'bare
awards' without explanation of any sort, in the belief that such awards are the least
likely to be challenged and overturned by a court," BERTHOLD H. HOENIGER,
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION HANDBOOK A3-25 (1st ed. 1991), and from the reality
that 9 U.S.C. § 10 limits review to a few specific grounds, and those grounds do not
include legal error. Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056,
1060 (9th Cir. 1991); Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1990); see
also Stephen J. Ware, "Opt-In" ForJudicial Review Of Errors Of Law Under The
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 263, 264 (1997)

("'[E]rror of law' ... is not listed in the FAA as a ground for vacating the
arbitrator's award.").
213 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,
483 (1989).
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the chief means of assessing the conflict would be to examine
whether Congress, through a statutory restructuring of the
relationships among the citizenry, evidenced a recognition that
involuntariness and/or a practical absence of bargaining power
chiefly characterized the statutorily protected citizens' submission to
the transaction terms at issue.
B. Whether FAA Arbitration Is in Conflict with Another
Statutory Policy
Demosthenes stated Athenian law on arbitration this way:
If the parties have a dispute with each other respecting their
private obligations, and desire to choose an arbiter, be it
lawful to them to select whomsoever they will. But when
they have mutually selected an arbiter, let them stand fast
by his decision and by no means carry on appeal from him
to another tribunal; but let the arbiter's sentence be
supreme. 214
Arbitration "begins with and depends upon an agreement
between the parties to submit their claims to one or more persons
chosen by them to serve as their arbitrator." 21 5 One of the more
influential figures in the field of arbitration was Frances Kellor, the
First Vice President of AAA from 1926 to 1952. She was adamant
that the nonjudicial alternative of arbitration always be based on
voluntariness:
Arbitration

is wholly

voluntary in character .... The

contract of which the arbitration clause is a part is a
voluntary agreement. No law requires the parties to make
such a contract,
nor does it give one party power to impose
21 6
it on another.

This central idea, that parties should be free to enter into

214

DEMOSTHENES,

Ex

RECENSIONE GUILIELMI

DINDORFII

572

(emphasis

added); see also Jones, supra note 71, at 243 (quoting Demosthenes).
215

Wesley A. Sturges, "Compulsory Arbitration" - What Is It?, 30

FORDHAM

L. REV. 1 (1961) (emphasis added); see also Sturges, supra note 31, at 1031
(same).
216

FRANCES KELLOR, ARBITRATION IN ACTION 7,

8 (1941); see also Morris

Stone, A Paradox in the Theory of Commercial Arbitration, 21
(quoting Kellor).

ARB J.156

(1966)
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agreements where they relinquish their rights to sue in a court of law
in favor of a less formal dispute settlement mechanism that shall
finally decide any dispute between them, is remised on both parties
having entered into a voluntary agreement. 2 8 When Justice Arthur J.
Goldberg addressed the American Arbitration Association at its
annual meeting on March 17, 1965, he gave voice to this:
Voluntary arbitration must be voluntary in a real and
genuine sense. There can be little concern that it is
genuinely voluntary, when arbitration is agreed upon in
collective bargaining between unions and employers
possessing an equality, more or less, of bargaining power.
The same is true of commercial arbitrations between
business concerns which enter into arbitration agreements
knowingly and advisedly. The situation may be different,
however, where an arbitration clause appears as "boiler
plate" in an installment sales contract, a lease or other
document where bargaining power may be unequal....
The courts have shown understandable reluctance to hold
parties to agreements which would have the effect of
adjudicating their rights without protections in a court of
law, where 21
the8 important elements of voluntariness are, in
absent.
fact,
Nothing in the text or the legislative history of the FAA alters
the fundamental principle that no arbitration provision should be
enforced in the absence of a knowing and voluntary agreement to
This point has always been emphasized as indispensable and essential to
arbitration. See, e.g., Kovin, supra note 179, at 230 (1966) (describing arbitration
as "a voluntary proceeding whereby the parties by agreement submit their
controversy" to a third party); Editorial, The Dilemma of Multiple Grievances in a
Single Arbitration, 17 ARB. J. 193 (1962) ("Voluntary arbitration is supposed to
rest upon the agreement of the parties."); Wellington, supra note 161, at 476
(stating that the "whole movement towards arbitration as a means of dispute
settlement stems in part from an acceptance of the proposition that it is wise policy
to encourage regulation that is formulated by the subjects of the regulation")
(emphasis added); Stanley D. Henderson, Arbitration and Medical Services:
Securing the Promise to Arbitrate Malpractice, 28 ARB. J. 14 (1973) ("Arbitration
begins with and depends upon voluntary agreement."); Harrison F. Blades, Inc. v.
Jarman Mem'l Hosp. Bldg. Fund, Inc., 109 Ill. App. 2d 224, 226, 248 N.E.2d 289,
290 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969) (stating that the consensual basis for arbitration must
remain "unextended and unenlarged either by construction or implication").
218 Arthur J. Goldberg, A Supreme Court Justice Looks at Arbitration, 20 ARB.
217

J. 13, 16(1965).
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arbitrate. When Justice Hugo Black reviewed the legislative history
of the FAA in the Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.
case, 2 19 he drew attention to this point by describing the legislative
hearings this way:
Mr. Cohen, the American Bar Association's draftsman of
the bill, assured the members of Congress that the Act
would not impair the right to a jury trial, because it
deprives a person of that right only when he has voluntarily
and validly waived it by agreeing to submit certain disputes
to arbitration.... The members of Congress revealed an
acute awareness of this problem. On several occasions they
expressed opposition to a law which would enforce even a
valid arbitration provision contained in a contract between
parties of unequal bargaining power. Senator Walsh cited
insurance, employment, construction, and shipping
contracts as routinely containing arbitration clauses being
offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to captive customers or
employees. He noted that such contracts "are really not
voluntarily [sic] things at all" because "there is nothing for
the man to do except to sign it; and then he surrenders his
right to have his case tried by the court ... ." He was
emphatically assured by the supporters of
the bill that it
22
was not their intention to cover such cases. 0
Having considered what FAA arbitration is, a voluntary
arbitration, we can now inquire into whether it conflicts with the
Magnuson-Moss Act's purposes.
C. The Conflict Between FAA Arbitration and the MagnusonMoss Act's Purposes
The central animating idea of the Magnuson-Moss Act was
that warrantors created warranties that were contracts in name only.
They were in reality nothing other than pieces of paper written by the
warrantors to suit their own interests and to subvert the interests of
consumers to whom they sold their products. 22 1 The purpose of the
Primo Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 407 (1967)
(Black, J., dissenting).
220 Id. at 413-14 (citations and footnotes omitted).
219

221 See Donald P. Rothschild, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: Does It
Balance Warrantorand Consumer Interests?,44 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 335, 335-36
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statute on the most fundamental level was to respond to the
completely involuntary nature of the modern consumer product
warranty. Since the warranty could be invoked by the warrantor, and
treated as an enforceable agreement in a court of law, Congress acted,
in effect, by standing in the shoes of America's consumers and
legislatively re-writing all such warranties. 222 Most of the provisions
in the Act are aimed at exactly this, from the provision declaring
illegal the disclaimer of implied warranties,
to the provision
barring the imposition of unreasonable duties beyond notification in
the context of full warranties,224 and ultimately to the detailed
provisions on what types of privately created dispute settlement
mechanisms a warrantor could put in its warranty.
The "purpose" of the Act was to address, not just the
inequality in bargaining power between consumers and warrantors,
but the absence of it. The very essence of the statute was tied up with
the legislative recognition that consumers were involuntarily
(1976) (noting that Senate Report No. 93-151 recognized the "the powerlessness of
the modern consumer to set the terms of his/her purchase"); see also Gunter, supra
note 149, at 1508 n. 122 (quoting Rothschild); see supra notes 44-50.
222 It bears emphasizing that the law of sales has long been moved by this very
concern. An example of this is found in U.C.C. § 2-316, which aims at preventing
the buyer from being surprised by unclear or inconspicuous language that
assertedly disclaims warranties. The official text of the Uniform Commercial Code,
at Comment I of Section 2-316, reads thus:
This section is designed principally to deal with those frequent clauses
in sales contracts which seek to exclude "all warranties, express or
implied." It seeks to protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained
language of disclaimer by denying effect to such language when
inconsistent with the language of express warranty and permitting the
exclusion of implied warranties only by conspicuous language or other
circumstances which protect the buyer from surprise.
WILLIAM B. DAVENPORT, DANIEL R. MURRAY
ILLINOIS PRACTICE: UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

& DONALD R. CASSLING, 2A
§ 5/2-316, 186 (1997) (quoting
Comment I of the official text); see also generally Tenn. Carolina Transp., Inc. v.
Strick Corp., 196 S.E.2d 711,718-19 (N.C. 1973) (applying the logic of Comment
1); R. J. Robertson, Jr., A Modest ProposalRegarding the Enforceability of "As-Is"
Disclaimers of Implied Warranties: What the Buyer Doesn't Know Shouldn't Hurt
Him, 99 COM. L. J. 1 (1994) (noting that the "expressed purpose of the drafters" of
U.C.C. § 2-316 was "to prevent enforcement of 'surprise' disclaimers"). But,
unlike such protections as reflected in U.C.C. § 2-316, Congress went much farther.
It branded disclaimers as illegal altogether. It burst asunder any fiction that the
.,agreements" represented by warranties contained truly voluntary terms.
223 See 15 U.S.C. § 2308 (2000).
224

See id. § 2304(b)(1 ).
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subjected to the terms of a warranty. Congress's most basic purpose
was to enact legislation in reaction to that reality.
There is never a voluntary agreement when it comes to a
consumer product warranty that accompanies family and household
items. 225 Of course, we could live without refrigerators, microwaves,
ovens, air conditioners, and the like, if we did not want to submit to
manufacturer warranties. But, this is hardly realistic, and the
imputation of voluntary consent to the terms of a product warranty is
a fiction. The courts should be reluctant to embrace such fictions as
these, ones that ordinary citizens would readily see as untrue.
The courts have erroneously asserted that there is no inherent
conflict between the concept of voluntary and knowing arbitration
agreements enunciated in the FAA and the principle that consumer
product warranties are adhesion contracts marked by a complete
absence of voluntariness. They have ignored the nature of the product
warranty and the chief purpose of the Congress. They have kept the
Congress from protecting consumers.

VIII. Brief Comment on Chevron
The statute's text, history and purposes are clear. The statute
as written does not allow for binding dispute settlement procedures
like arbitration mechanisms to be inserted into a consumer product
warranty, obviating the need to reach the FTC's regulations.
However, this is not widely accepted, and so it is appropriate to
consider briefly the Chevron body of law. 226
Commentators and courts advocating binding arbitration in
this context have bypassed a reasoned and careful statutory analysis,
only to focus their attention on whether the FTC's interpretation
of
227
the federal statute it is entrusted to enforce is a problem.
It is
225

Note that the Act is limited to consumer products "used for personal,

family, or household purposes." Id. § 2301 (1).
226 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
227In promulgating legislative regulations under the Magnuson-Moss Act, the

FTC rejected industry arguments for binding arbitration. It noted, "[s]everal

industry representatives contended that warrantors should be allowed to require
consumers to resort to mechanisms whose decisions would be legally binding (e.g.,
binding arbitration). The Rule does not allow this ....
" 40 Fed. Reg. 60210 (Dec.
31, 1975). See also 64 Fed. Reg. 19708 (April 22, 1999) (discussing earlier
decision on "the legality and the merits of mandatory binding arbitration clauses in
consumer products warranties"). The FTC based its 1975 decision in part on the
fact that "Congressional intent was that decisions of Section 110 Mechanisms not
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understandable that the principles of Chevron and its progeny give
them pause. It is no easy thing for a court these days to simply
repudiate an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute. We
know that when legislative regulations are promulgated pursuant to
an express grant of formal rulemaking authority by the United States
Congress, as was done here, 2 28 they are entitled to a high level of

deference. 229

When

those

regulations

are

promulgated

be legally binding." 40 Fed. Reg. 60210 (Dec. 31, 1975). The agency thus surely
considered the evidence of legislative intent set forth herein. The FTC also found
that it could not structure a system allowing for binding arbitration under the Act
that would "ensure sufficient protections for consumers." 40 Fed. Reg. 60210.
Under the regulations adopted, "[d]ecisions of the Mechanism shall not be legally
binding on any person." 16 C.F.R. § 703.5(j) (2000) (emphasis added). See also 16
C.F.R. § 703.5 (g) (mandating that the "Mechanism shall inform the consumer...
that: (1) If he or she is dissatisfied with its decision or warrantor's intended actions,
or eventual performance, legal remedies, including use of small claims courts, may
be pursued; (2) The Mechanism's decision is admissible in evidence as provided in
section 110(a)(3) of the Act."). The FTC regulations defined a "mechanism" as "an
informal dispute settlement procedure which is incorporated into the terms of a
written warranty to which any provision of Title I of the Act applies." Id.
§ 703.1(e). The FTC adopted the position that "informal dispute settlement
procedures," "mechanisms" and "proceedings," as such terms are used in the
statute, must be read to encompass all non-judicial dispute resolution procedures,
including arbitration. See, e.g., 40 Fed. Reg. 60210 (Dec. 31, 1975) (characterizing
binding arbitration as a type of "mechanism[ ] whose decisions would be legally
binding"). Binding arbitration is thus precluded by the regulations' plain language
specifying that mechanisms must "not be legally binding" on any party. 16 C.F.R.
§ 703.5(j).
228 The FTC's legislative regulations (issued in 1975) should be distinguished
from its interpretive regulations (issued in 1977). The former, found at 16 C.F.R.
§§ 701-703, see supra note 227, were promulgated pursuant to an express
delegation of rulemaking authority in 15 U.S.C. §§ 2309-2310. They were created
following the rulemaking procedure Congress established, a careful and formal one
involving a high level of public participation. See 15 U.S.C. § 2309 (noting that to
properly prescribe a rule under the Act, the FTC must "give interested persons an
opportunity for oral presentations of data, views, and arguments, in addition to
written submissions"). The interpretive regulations, found at 16 C.F.R. § 700, also
bar binding arbitration. See 16 C.F.R. § 700.8. They are not entitled to the same
level of Chevron deference. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 157 (1991). They are "entitled to respect," provided they
have the "power to persuade," as stated in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,
140 (1944), which they do have here. See also Christensen v. Harris County, 529
U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (citing Skidmore).
229 As the Supreme Court has explained, "express congressional authorizations
to engage in the process of rulemaking" are "a very good indicator of delegation
meriting Chevron treatment." United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229
(2001); see also id. at 230 ("It is fair to assume generally that Congress
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contemporaneously, as they were here by an agency that worked for
years shoulder to shoulder with the Congress, 230 deference is
particularly appropriate.23 ' We know that when the regulations set
forth an interpretation of the statute that has been adhered to
consistently over time, courts are especially reluctant to give the
agency's interpretation no deference. 2 This is the case here where
having promulgated its legislative regulations in 1975 the agency
reaffirmed them as recently as 1999.233 When an agency has expertise
contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a
relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and
deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force.").
230 It is important to remember just how important this legislation was to the
FTC, an agency that had become known as the "sleeping lady of Pennsylvania
Avenue" at a time when there was a pervasive consumer protection problem in our
Nation. See supra note 51.
231 An administrative interpretation "has peculiar weight when it involves a
contemporaneous construction of a statute by the [persons] charged with the
responsibility of setting its machinery in motion, of making the parts work
efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new." Zenith Radio Corp. v.
United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450 (1978) (quoting Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co.
v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933)). The detailed analysis of the legislative
history in this article shows that from the very outset of the legislative process the
FTC's Chairmen Caspar Weinberger and later Miles Kirkpatrick and their staff
were intimately involved with the development of Magnuson-Moss. See Stephen
Breyer, JudicialReview of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363,
368 (1986) (deference to contemporaneous agency interpretation justified in part by
the fact that "[t]he agency that enforces a statute may have had a hand in drafting
its provisions" and that the agency "may possess an internal history in the form of
documents or 'handed-down oral tradition' that casts light on the meaning of a
difficult phrase or provision").
232 While agency interpretations that are revised over time are certainly
entitled to Chevron deference, see Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 186 (1991),
longstanding and consistent agency interpretations carry special weight. See Nat'l
Labor Relations Bd. v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 274-75 (1974) ("[A]
court may accord great weight to the longstanding interpretation placed on a statute
by an agency charged with its administration."); see also Smiley v. Citibank (South
Dakota), 517 U.S. 735, 740 (1996) (observing that "agency interpretations that are
of long standing come before us with a certain 'credential of reasonableness' since
it is rare that error would long persist").
233 On April 22, 1999, the FTC reported on an extensive review of its
regulations in the warranty field and it explicitly reaffirmed its position that the
Magnuson-Moss Act prohibits binding arbitration. 64 Fed. Reg. 19708-19709
(Apr. 22, 1999). The FTC approved of the decision in Wilson v. Waverlee Homes,
Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1530 (M.D. Ala. 1997), affd without opinion, 127 F.3d 40 (11th
Cir. 1997), which held binding arbitration clauses in time-of-sale warranties illegal
under the Act. 64 Fed. Reg. 19708 n.72 (1999). In this 1999 reaffirmation of its
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in the subject matter at issue, courts also take this into consideration
in deciding whether to defer to their statutory interpretations.2 34

The principles of the entire Chevron body of law are no
different from the authoritative precepts of statutory construction.
They are not to be applied or not applied at will. They commend an
approach that is legitimate, one that ensures the will of the legislative
body is effectuated by our courts.

IX. Is the Legal Order Grounded in Reason?
The lower federal court and the state supreme court decisions
legislative rules, the FTC explained that it requested comments on its rules and
guides interpreting and implementing the Magnuson-Moss Act "as part of its
regulatory review program, under which it reviews rules and guides periodically in
order to obtain information about the costs and benefits of the rules and guides
under review, as well as their regulatory and economic impact." 64 Fed. Reg.
19700 (Apr. 22, 1999). "After careful review of the comments received in
response" to its request, the FTC decided to retain the interpretations and rules
without change. The FTC wrote:
[T]he Commission determined that 'reference within the written
warranty to any binding, non-judicial remedy is prohibited by the Rule
and the Act.' The Commission believes that this interpretation
continues to be correct. Therefore, the Commission has determined not
to amend 16 C.F.R. § 703.50) to allow for binding arbitration. Rule
703 will continue to prohibit warrantors from including binding
arbitration clauses in their contracts with consumers that would require
consumers to submit warranty disputes to binding arbitration.
64 Fed. Reg. 19708-19709. The FTC indicated, as the court in Wilson v. Waverlee
did, that it was troubled by a statutory construction that "would enable warrantors
and the retailers selling their products to avoid the requirements of the Warranty
Act simply by inserting binding arbitration clauses in their sales contracts." 64 Fed.
Reg. 19709 & n.72. It is also appropriate to note that the FTC's policy has
consistently been that "warrantors are not precluded from offering a binding
arbitration option to consumers after a warranty dispute has arisen." 64 Fed. Reg.
19708 & n.70 (Apr. 22, 1999). The FTC understands the distinction between the
involuntariness of warranty terms tendered at the time of sale, and post-sale
transactions where there can be a meaningful choice exercised by a consumer as to
whether he wants to waive his rights.
234 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001). One need only
consider the provisions in the United States Code pertaining to the Federal Trade
Commission Act and its scores of amendments to realize that the FTC is the federal
government's "expert" in the arena of consumer protection. But apart from its
general consumer protection expertise, the FTC was entrusted by Congress and the
President with the task of performing a comprehensive study of the issues in this
precise area - consumer protection in product warranties. Because of this study, its
"expertness" in this particular subject matter is undeniable.
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questioned here are decisions that rest on "word-magic" and a
disregard of reality. The word "arbitration" was not used in the
statute, it is said. If Congress had intended to displace the arbitration
made permissible under the FAA, then Congress, which had enacted
the federal arbitration statute but a half-century before, would have
mentioned it. 235 That it did not, clearly shows Magnuson-Moss

claims are subject to pre-dispute binding arbitration clauses inserted
into consumer product warranties. What of all those provisions about
"informal dispute settlement mechanisms" inserted into warranties?
They are "of a different nature" because the word "arbitration" was
not used.
The analysis is both simple and incorrect. Yet it is adhered to
on the suspect ground that there is a "liberal policy" that favors the
enforcement of arbitration clauses in all contexts. The MagnusonMoss Warranty Act cannot be ignored. Courts must engage in the
analytical process of statutory interpretation and assess the text,
legislative history, and purposes of the Act. It appears that a number
of courts have really not done that, unduly influenced by a poorly
drafted United States Supreme Court decision in Gilmer. Gilmer
suggested that the statutory interpretation analysis, while it should be
invoked, is to be affected, perhaps dispositively, by a canon of
statutory construction. This has gone unchallenged, and unnoticed.
Even in some of our Nation's leading law journals, these realities
have not been specifically confronted.
Legal rules and principles are devices used by those
participants in our court system who each day drive the development
of our law, who work to make it responsive to the needs of our
society. They are instruments that time has proven facilitate reason,
235

In the 1970s, FAA-governed arbitration was not in use as a means of

resolving consumer claims. Van Wezel Stone, supra note 77, at 935. It was only
within the last eighteen years that the Supreme Court of the United States began
interpreting the FAA more broadly so as to promote its use in all forms of
contractual relationships. Id. at 935-36, 943-54. See also Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-16 (1984); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490-91 (1987).
Courts that have placed emphasis on the fact that FAA arbitration was not
mentioned in the Magnuson-Moss Act, and that have drawn therefrom the
conclusion that Congress did not intend to interfere with the FAA when it enacted
Magnuson-Moss, have failed to grasp this essential point. Indeed, when learned
attorneys like Antonin Scalia, a future Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, and
Robert Braucher, then an Associate Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, issued in 1973 the National Institute for Consumer Justice's final
report, Redress of Consumer Grievances, they did not focus on arbitration under
the Federal Arbitration Act as a mechanism under which consumer warranty claims
could be resolved.

246

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 1.5: 3

the vehicle for justice. Artificial forms of judicial analysis that
abandon the rigorous and faithful application of such authoritative
precepts as the principles of statutory construction must be avoided.
They remove from our grasp the tools that are the bulwark against a
jurisprudence that adheres to fictions and shields injustice from
scrutiny.

X. Conclusion
For the past fifteen years there has been a polarized discourse
on the subject of arbitration. The plaintiffs come into court again and
again and make the tired argument that arbitration is either inherently
unconscionable or a violation of the very statutory rights that the
claimant aims to enforce. These arguments have met with limited
success. The defendants, for their part, fashion some of the most
complex, costly and difficult to use procedures they can possibly
devise. They seek to create alternative procedures that will
discourage any effort at securing redress.
One day these two polar extremes will hear what our Nation's
judges have been telling us for a decade and a half. Arbitration is a
good thing, arbitration must be embraced.
We do not have unlimited judicial resources in our society,
and even if we did, the court processes are formal, and they are
structured, and they are costly, and they are time-consuming. We
must work together to find alternative redress mechanisms to solve
many of the grievances in our society, and this author submits that
the Magnuson-Moss Act sets forth an ideal legislative model for how
arbitration can best work in many of the arenas of our society.
To understand the statute, one need only look directly at it.
Think about what the Congress did here. It encouraged manufacturers
and suppliers throughout the country to work to develop nonjudicial
methods of dispute settlement. Such arbitration procedures do not
spring to life like Athena from the head of Zeus. Someone has to
undertake the effort to put them into being and someone has to pay
for them. The Congress encouraged the country's sellers of consumer
products to do just that. But, Congress said they have to be fair, and
they have to comply with our administrative agency's rules designed
to ensure the even-handed treatment of consumers. If this is done,
Congress said, then all consumer claims can be channeled into these
low-cost and expeditious procedures.
Though consumers always retain the right to go to court, most
of the claims will be resolved without that necessity. This is obvious
when we consider what else Congress provided in its statute.
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Congress stated that all the terms and conditions of a warranty - and
there is no more important term than how you go about enforcing the
warranty - must be set forth "fully and conspicuously" in "simple"
language, language that is readily understandable. Not readily
understandable to a lawyer, but readily understandable to a
"reasonable, average" consumer. So in most instances, the consumer
could read his warranty and readily understand that a procedure is
available and that he can use it himself, without even hiring a lawyer.
It would be reasonable for him to do this, as the fairness of the
procedure would be under the supervision of a federal regulatory
agency with the power to ensure things are done right.
Through five long years of diligent effort, the United States
Congress set in place a legislative scheme that balanced the interests
of consumers and manufacturers, and advanced the interests of
society as a whole. Indeed, the only interests that are not served by
this scheme would be the interests of the lawyers. But this author
suspects, he truly does believe, that society would be willing to live
with that.
The Magnuson-Moss Act sets forth an ideal legislative model
for how arbitration can best work in our society. The courts are called
upon here. Embrace it, and enforce it.

